The State Vs. Siba Prasad

.....extended period of limitation maintainability - held, if the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal cannot be admitted to consideration unless other requirements are complied with. the provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot be entertained i.e. cannot be admitted for consideration unless the statutory deposit is made and for this purpose the court has the discretion either to grant time to make the deposit or not. no formal order condoning the delay is necessary, an order of adjournment would suffice. the provisions of limitation embodied in the substantive provision of the sub-section (1) of section 173 of the act does not extend to the provision relating to the deposit of statutory amount as embodies in the first proviso. therefore an appeal filed within the period of limitation or within the extended period of limitation, cannot be admitted for hearing on merit unless the statutory deposit is made either with the memo of appeal or on such date as may be permitted by the court. no specific order condoning any delay for the purpose of deposit under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 is necessary. [new india assurance co. ltd. v md. makubur rahman, 1993 (2) glr 430 and new india assurance co. ltd. v smt rita devi, 1997(2) glt 406, approved. new india assurance co. ltd. v birendra mohan de, 1995 (2) gau lt 218 (db) and union of india v smt gita banik, 1996 (2) glt 246, are not good law]. - on 16-8-51 the magistrate recorded an order that the time occupied by the investigation was unreasonable in the extreme and that he would warn the prosecutor that the.....orderpanigrahi, j.1. the facts giving rise to this reference by the sessions judge, mayurbhanj, are simple. the accused, sivaprasad tripathy, was produced before a magistrate charged with an offence under section 409, i. p. c. on 4-1-51 and was released on bail by the magistrate on the same date. the case was under police investigation till 16-8-51 and several adjournments had been taken by the police for filing of charge-sheet. on 16-8-51 the magistrate recorded an order that the time occupied by the investigation was unreasonable in the extreme and that he would warn the prosecutor that the proceedings against the accused would be dropped if the charge-sheet was not filed before 31-8-51. but even on that date charge-sheet was not filed and the same was adjourned to 3-9-51. the investigation officer again prayed for time and the case was directed to be put up on 22-9-51. on that day also the investigating officer failed to produce the charge-sheet, and thereupon the magistrate ordered that the accused be released from the bail bond. on 1-11-51 the charge-sheet was produced under section 409, i. p. c. the magistrate held that he had no power to revive the case which he had already dismissed on a previous occasion, and interpreted his order (sic) 22-9-51 releasing the accused from the (sic) bond as an order of discharge, under section 252 (sic) criminal p. c. the learned sessions judge (sic) of opinion that this view of the magistrate's incorrect and has recommended that the order must accordingly be set aside.2. it is clear that until the charge-sheet has been filed a magistrate cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. there is a distinction between 'a magistrate' and 'the court of a magistrate'. the magistrate could take cognizance of the offence and direct the issue of process only on receipt of a police report under section 190, criminal p. c. till that stage is reached, he is said to be acting only as a magistrate controlling the investigation.....