Devendra Prasad Singh Vs. R.P. Ritolia, C.M.D. Ccl and ors.

- motor vehicles act, 1988 [c.a. no. 59/1988]section 173(1) proviso; [d. biswas, amitava roy & i.a.ansari, jj] appeal without statutory deposit but within limitation/or extended period of limitation maintainability - held, if the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal cannot be admitted to consideration unless other requirements are complied with. the provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot be entertained i.e. cannot be admitted for consideration unless the statutory deposit is made and for this purpose the court has the discretion either to grant time to make the deposit or not. no formal order condoning the delay is necessary, an order of adjournment would suffice. the provisions of limitation embodied in the substantive provision of the sub-section (1) of section 173 of the act does not extend to the provision relating to the deposit of statutory amount as embodies in the first proviso. therefore an appeal filed within the period of limitation or within the extended period of limitation, cannot be admitted for hearing on merit unless the statutory deposit is made either with the memo of appeal or on such date as may be permitted by the court. no specific order condoning any delay for the purpose of deposit under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 is necessary. [new india assurance co. ltd. v md. makubur rahman, 1993 (2) glr 430 and new india assurance co. ltd. v smt rita devi, 1997(2) glt 406, approved. new india assurance co. ltd. v birendra mohan de, 1995 (2) gau lt 218 (db) and union of india v smt gita banik, 1996 (2) glt 246, are not good law]. .....petitioner. it is stated that this amount has been paid to the petitioner after considering his representation and after calculation, the aforesaid amount became payable to him.5. counsel for the petitioner, however, is still aggrieved and has submitted that certain amounts towards leave encashment and interest for the delayed payment of the retiral dues have not yet been paid.6. but the counsel for the petitioner has to realise that this contention cannot be appreciated while dealing with contempt petition, as the order, which is sought to be complied, had merely directed to dispose of the representation of the petitioner. to avert interference of this court, the respon-dent-contemnors, while disposing the representation of the petitioner, have now paid the retiral dues of the petitioner through a cross-cheque in the court to his counsel, which has been accepted by him. if the petitioner is still aggrieved by the fact that certain amounts towards leave encashment and interest for the delayed payment of the retiral dues have not been paid, he is at liberty to move before the appropriate forum claiming the same.in so far as this contempt petition is concerned, the same is disposed of taking into account the fact that the respondents have now paid the retiral dues of the petitioner, as stated above.