BhaktIn Bai and ors. Vs. Jarnail Singh and ors.

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........motor claims tribunal, rajnandgaon, whereby the application for adjournment filed on behalf of the appellants/claimants was dismissed, so also the claim petition itself.2. it appears that the appellants/claimants have filed an application under section 166 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 claiming compensation on account of death of ramesh kumar in a motor accident arising out of collision of two trucks. the appellants/claimants adduced some evidence, but on a subsequent opportunity and hearing for adducing further evidence, the appellants were absent. their counsel filed an application for adjournment as well as an opportunity to lead additional evidence. that application was dismissed by the impugned order and consequently the claim petition was also dismissed.3. learned counsel for appellants has mainly urged that, even if the prayer and application for adjournment filed by the appellants/claimants did not find favour with the tribunal, since the appellants had adduced substantial evidence, their claim petition should have been decided on the basis of the evidence already led by them. it has further been submitted that the appellants were illiterate and poor persons and have not been in a position to adduce further evidence. it has, therefore, been urged that though several opportunities have been granted to adduce evidence, but it is submitted that if one more opportunity is granted to the appellants they would be able to substantiate their claim.4. learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 stated that in case the appellants are granted opportunity to adduce evidence, the respondent should be permitted to lead evidence in rebuttal. counsel for both the parties agreed that they would be keeping their witnesses present on the date fixed by the tribunal in that regard.5. after considering the contentions as above, it appears that the appellants/claimants had already adduced evidence in the case. in the circumstances the tribunal was not justified in dismissing.....