Bhurla Vs. Makingir and ors.

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........counsel for the appellant submits that appellant is a poor person and illiterate also. it is submitted that the appellant appeared before the learned tribunal a day before the fixed date and moved the application for recording the evidence of the appellant which was wrongly rejected. learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a case reported in mahendra rathore v. omkar singh 2001 acj 1436 (sc), wherein in a claim case the hon'ble apex court has observed that:(4) ...in such matters a justice oriented approach and not a too technical or a pedantic approach is expected to be adopted by the courts more so when the application sought to be restored for hearing was a claim case arising out of a motor accident. refusal on the part of tribunal to restore the claim petition, as also on the part of high court to show indulgence to the appellant has occasioned failure of justice.5. i have perused the record, the learned tribunal was of the view that a number of opportunities were given and since last time was given, therefore, the appellant's application was dismissed as there was no occasion to give further time. there is no army rule which is applicable for disposal of the civil cases. when the appellant was present before conclusion of the case, then learned tribunal ought to have recorded the statement of the appellant for finally adjudicating the matter.6. in view of this, the impugned award is hereby set aside. the case is sent back to the tribunal to record the evidence of the parties and conclude the same at the earliest possible preferably within a period of six months. since the matter is old one, therefore, parties are directed to remain present before the tribunal on 29.8.2005.7. with the aforesaid observations this appeal stands disposed of.