Pyarsingh Vs. Kamlabai and ors.

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture.....deepak verma and s.k. seth, jj.1. mr. manish jain, learned counsel for appellant.none for respondent nos. 1 and 2.mr. h.g. shukla, learned counsel for respondent no. 3. they are heard on i.a. no. 1148 of 2003, an application made by appellant for dispensing with service of notice on respondent nos. 1 and 2. application considered. it is hereby allowed. with consent arguments heard on merits.2. for the injuries sustained by the appellant in a motor accident whereby he had suffered compound and multiple fractures on both legs, a total amount of rs. 1,50,000 has been awarded to him by the claims tribunal vide its order dated 16.3.2002. evidence of pw 1 dr. sahid hussain and pw 2 sushil gupta would show that his permanent disability in both legs was to the tune of 32.6 per cent. at the time of the accident he was aged about 38 years and was engaged in the business of selling chat from his shop. the injuries have been described at length by pw 1, dr. sahid hussain. there was also shortening of leg by 2 cm. we have also seen the photograph of appellant filed before the claims tribunal. we are fully satisfied with regard to the nature of injuries and the permanent disability suffered by the present appellant.3. we also find that the amount awarded to the appellant was on lower side. the same deserves to be enhanced. after considering the facts and features of the case we are of the opinion that a total amount of rs. 2,50,000 inclusive of the medical treatment would be just and proper. we, accordingly, modify the impugned award and hold the appellant is entitled to receive a total amount of rs. 2,50,000 from the respondents jointly and severally. the enhanced/difference amount would carry interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from the date of application till it is paid.4. the impugned award is modified to the extent mentioned above. the appeal thus stands partly allowed along with costs throughout. counsel's fee rs. 1,000, if certified.