Virendra Singh Vs. Ashok Kumar and ors.

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........be answered in the negative.4. this court in ghisalal v. nihalsingh, 1992 acj 181 (mp) and then in in re: jamsingh, misc. appeal no. 444 of 1992; decided on 24.2.2001, following a apex court decision in melepurath sankunni ezhuthassan v. thekittil geopalankutty nair, 1986 acj 440 (sc), has held that although the legal representatives of the deceased appellant are entitled to the amount of compensation already awarded by the tribunal, are however not entitled to prosecute an appeal filed by the deceased injured for enhancement of the amount of compensation. it is held that the amount already awarded formed part of the estate of the deceased and as such, the legal representatives of the deceased are entitled to receive the same. but they are certainly not entitled to seek any enhancement of the amount of the award.5. accordingly we dispose of the aforesaid applications also this appeal with the direction that the amount already awarded may be recovered (if already not paid) by the legal representatives of the deceased appellant but no cause of action survives to them for prosecuting this appeal, which stands abated.there shall be no orders as to the costs of this appeal.