Vimal C. Sodhani Vs. Parag Fans and Cooling System Ltd. and ors.

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........govern disposal of other two connected company petitions being company petition nos. 13 and 14 of 2002 because all these petitions involve common points.2. this is a company petition filed by one vimal sodhani under section 433(e) of the companies act, 1956, seeking winding up of respondent no. 1 company. the winding up is claimed essentially on the ground of inability to pay the alleged debt.3. the petition though filed or i may say claimed to have been filed by mr. vimal sodhani but the same is filed by one rajesh son of shanti swaroop sodhani as power of attorney holder of vimal sodhani, i.e., petitioner. in other words, the petition is signed, verified and affirmed by mr. rajesh sodhani in his capacity of the petitioner's power of attorney holder. in support of this a copy of power of attorney is filed as annexure pi.4. a perusal of this power of attorney (annexure pi) would indicate that in the first place, it does not bear any date. in other words, it is not known as to on what date it is executed by vimal sodhani. secondly, it does not empower mr. rajesh to file company petition for and on behalf of vimal sodhani.5. in my opinion, these two defects taken note of supra renders the power of attorney bad in law and as a consequence the filing of the company petition. in order to have a valid and legal power of attorney it must bear the date, as to on what date the same was executed by the person concerned. secondly, it must have a place where it is executed. indeed, these are the bare requirements of any legal and valid power of attorney. absence of these two renders it invalid.6. clause (iii) of the so-called power of attorney, even if it is held to be legal, does not empower/authorise mr. rajesh to file a company petition against the respondent-company. clause (iii) only empowers the power of attorney holder to file suit for recovery of any debt or any legal proceeding for such recovery. this clause cannot be construed to empower the power of attorney.....