Arun Vs. Abdul Rashid and ors.

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........tune of rs. 8,00,000. according to the appellant compensation awarded by the tribunal is meagre and deserves enhancement, however, by filing the appeal inadequacy of the compensation has been assailed.3. it is not necessary to narrate the entire facts in detail, such as how the accident occurred, who was negligent in driving the offending vehicle, who is liable to pay compensation, etc., because the tribunal has already recorded the findings in favour of the appellant, none of those findings have been challenged at the instance of the respondents, that is, owner/driver/insurance company by filing cross-objection or cross-appeal. in that view of the matter it is not necessary to burden the judgment by detailing the facts on all these issues.4. mr. manish jain, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that this case of amputation of left hand of 6 years old boy from the wrist, however, the tribunal has awarded compensation of rs. 1,66,865 in lump sum, which is on lesser side and also relied on the judgment of division bench of this court in the case of rekha v. shri travels : 2003 acj 1559 (mp). it is argued that at least rs. 3,00,000 ought to have been awarded by the tribunal, therefore, compensation awarded by the tribunal is liable to be enhanced.5. mr. mayank upadhayay, the learned counsel appearing for respondent insurance company submits that amount of compensation as awarded by the claims tribunal is appropriate, just and reasonable. if the percentage of permanent disability and the multiplier which is applicable, (sic) even then compensation is sufficiently awarded by the tribunal, however, this appeal is liable to be dismissed.6. after having heard, learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the records, it is not in dispute that 6 years old boy has lost his left hand from wrist due to amputation. however in such a case not only the loss of earnings is required to be taken note, but also for pain and suffering of whole life and some amount.....