Jandel Singh Vs. State of M.P. and ors.

Jandel Singh vs State of M.P. and ors.

Disposition Petition allowed Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Aug 27, 2002

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/511400
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge: P.C. Agarwal, J.
Decided On: Aug 27, 2002
Case Number: Crl. Revn. No. 80 of 2000
Subject: Criminal
Disposition: Petition allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive defi...

Key legal issue: Criminal
Outcome / disposition: Petition allowed
Acts & sections: Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Sections 473

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Jandel Singh

Advocate Arun Pateriya, Adv.

Respondent

State of M.P. and ors.

Advocate A.K. Ahirwar, Addl. Govt., Adv. for No. 1 and ;Vikrant Sharma, Advs. for Nos. 2 to 3

Legal References

Acts: Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Sections 473
Cases Referred: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutt
Reported In: 2003CriLJ1044

Excerpt

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........learned sessions judge did not look into the provisions of section 473 of the code of criminal procedure 1973 which authorises the court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. in the present case a cross-case was pending in the sessions court. secondly, the police had registered a crime under sections 341, 294, 324 and 34 of the code, instead of directing the petitioner to the criminal court holding that his case is not cognizable by the police. the police had not filed either any charge-sheet or any final report in due time. a final report was prepared on 31 -12-1997 and was got initialed by the sdo (p), dabra thereafter. anyhow, the same was never produced before the competent magistrate for its acceptance. the complaint by the petitioner was only 5 days delayed. in these circumstances, actually the delay in complaint was not only properly explained but it was necessary in the interest of justice to condone delay as there had been a pending cross-case in the court of session.3. the learned advocate for the respondent nos. 2 to 5 has drawn my attention to shankar lal v. state of m.p. 1990 jab lj 782 a case under excise act. gyaniram v. state of m.p. 1994 jab lj 733, a case under section 498a of the code in which delay in prosecuting the case was not explained. mohammad yakub khan v. mohammad sharif khan 2000 (1) c cr j 292 (madh pra), a case under sections 294 and 223 of the code in which the complaints were held to be time barred in absence of any explanation for delay. of course, the provisions of section 468 of the code of criminal procedure have prescribed a time limit beyond which taking cognizance of the offence is barred but in the present case the petitioner was able to show the facts and circumstances in which the delay was properly.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

P.C. Agarwal, J.

1. The petitioner had lodged an FIR on 23-10-97 and P.S. Gijora had registered a Crime No. 63/97 under Sections 341, 294, 324/34 of the Indian Penal Code (Code for short). Anyhow, neither any charge-sheet was filed nor any final report was submitted by the Police. Hence the petitioner filed a criminal complaint on 28-10-98 in Criminal Court under Sections 341, 294, 324, 323, 506, Part II of the Code. The magistrate after usual enquiry took cognizance on 6-4-1999 under Sections 294 and 323 of the Code and the case was committed to the Court of Session as there was a cross case which was triable by the Court of Session. The Addl. Sessions Judge on 9-2-00 after hearing both the parties held that the criminal complaint was time barred and no cognizance under Sections 323 and 294 of the Code could be taken after elapse of a period of one year as both these offences were punishable at the most with imprisonment for one year.

2. The grievance of the petitioner has been that the learned Sessions Judge did not look into the provisions of Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 which authorises the Court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. In the present case a cross-case was pending in the Sessions Court. Secondly, the Police had registered a crime under Sections 341, 294, 324 and 34 of the Code, instead of directing the petitioner to the Criminal Court holding that his case is not cognizable by the Police. The Police had not filed either any charge-sheet or any final report in due time. A final report was prepared on 31 -12-1997 and was got initialed by the SDO (P), Dabra thereafter. Anyhow, the same was never produced before the competent Magistrate for its acceptance. The complaint by the petitioner was only 5 days delayed. In these circumstances, actually the delay in complaint was not only properly explained but it was necessary in the interest of justice to condone delay as there had been a pending cross-case in the Court of Session.

3. The learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 has drawn my attention to Shankar Lal v. State of M.P. 1990 Jab LJ 782 a case under Excise Act. Gyaniram v. State of M.P. 1994 Jab LJ 733, a case under Section 498A of the Code in which delay in prosecuting the case was not explained. Mohammad Yakub Khan v. Mohammad Sharif Khan 2000 (1) C Cr J 292 (Madh Pra), a case under Sections 294 and 223 of the Code in which the complaints were held to be time barred in absence of any explanation for delay. Of course, the provisions of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have prescribed a time limit beyond which taking cognizance of the offence is barred but in the present case the petitioner was able to show the facts and circumstances in which the delay was properly explained.

4. In the State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutt (2000 (1) C Cr J 111 : (2000 Cri LJ 485) (SC)), the Apex Court has explained how the power of Court for extending the period of limitation for taking cognizance should be exercised. To quote the Apex Court itself.

'7. Section 473 confers power on the Court taking cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained and that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. Obviously, therefore in respect of the offences for which a period of limitation has been provided in Section 468, the power has been conferred on the Court taking cognizance to extend the said period of limitation where proper and satisfactory explanation of the delay is available and where the Court taking cognizance finds that it would be in the interest of justice. This discretion conferred on the Court has to be exercised judicially and on well recognized principles. This being a cognizance, wherever the Court exercises this discretion the same must be by a speaking order, indicating the satisfaction of the Court that the delay was satisfactorily explained and condonation of the same was in the interest of justice. ' (Page 115 of C Cri J) : (at p 488 of Cri LJ) :

5. In view of the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court the delay in filing the complaint has to be condoned. The impugned order of learned Sessions Judge is set aside. He shall proceed with the trial according to law after framing necessary charges. The parties shall remain present before the Court of Session on 11-9-2002.

Same Court & Year Madhya Pradesh · 2002 Same Parties Jandel Singh vs State of M.P. and ors. Same Subject Criminal Same Judge P.C. Agarwal, J. Acts & Sections Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Sections 473

Criminal