Ajay and Jeetu and ors. Vs. the State

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture.....orderuma nath singh, j.1. this criminal revision impugns the order dated 5-9-2002 passed by the learned third additional sessions judge, hoshangabad, in sessions trial no. 19/2001, framing charge against the applicants under section 307 read with section 34, ipc.2. the impugned order of the learned judge is a reasoned order and he has mentioned that there was an exhortation to kill the complainant; that, but for the arrival of two police personnel namely narayan prasad yadav and anil kumar maurya, applicants would not have stopped the assaults and ran away from the place of incident; that the accused/applicants were duly armed with weapons to cause assaults in a concerted manner; and that they caused a serious injury damaging the left eye of the applicant. the hon'ble apex court in the matter of state of delhi v. gyan devi, (air 2001 sc 40 : (2001 cri lj 124) has laid down the ratio that the high court should not quash the charges unless the case happens to be an exceptional case. further, the hon'ble apex court in the matter of om wati (smt.) v. state, through delhi admn. (2001) 4 scc 333 : (2001 cri lj 17231 has laid down the guidelines that unless there is a glaring injustice, the high court should not interfere with framing of charges.3. this court refrains from making any observations on merits lest it would prejudice the case of either of the parties during the trial. thus, in the totality of circumstances and the ratio of judgments (supra). i do not find any merit in the criminal revision, which is hereby dismissed.