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Deevan Arjun Singh Vs. State and anr.

Deevan Arjun Singh vs State and anr.

Type Court Judgment Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Oct 18, 2002
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/511241

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Citation
Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
M.Cr.C. No. 3839 of 2000
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive defi...

Key legal issue
Criminal
Acts & sections
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 451

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Deevan Arjun Singh

Advocate Vijay Nayak and ;J.S. Singh, Advs.

Respondent

State and anr.

Advocate R.A. Robertson, P.L.

Legal References

Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1974 - Sections 451
Cases Referred
Madhukar Rao v. State of M. P.
Reported In
2003CriLJ3685

Excerpt

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........of the state government under section 39(1)(d) of the act.'it is also found explained by the full bench that--'in order that the seized property may be treated as property of the state, there should be a finding by the competent court that vehicle seized has been used for committing an offence, the property seized under section 50 of the wild life (protection) act for an alleged offender cannot become property of the state under clause (d) of section 39(1) unless there is a trial and a finding reached by the competent court that the property was used for committing an offence under the act.'4. since the criminal case in respect of aforesaid p.o.r. is not disposed of, therefore, so far there is no finding of competent court on the fact that the vehicle seized has been used for committing an offence, therefore, on mere conclusion of confiscation proceeding by d.f.o. narsinghpur, on 18-10- 99, which is stated to have resulted in forfeiture of petitioner's jeep, does not by itself take away the jurisdiction of learned c.j.m. narsinghpur, in considering petitioner's application of interim custody. consequently, the order, dated 7-3-2000, passed by c.j.m. narsinghpur, on petitioner's supurdgi application so also order dated 2.-6-2000, passed by special judge (atrocities), narsinghpur, in petitioner's criminal revision no. 33/2000, are set aside and the c.j.m. narsinghpur, is directed to dispose of the petitioner's supurdgi application afresh, in the light of the aforesaid legal position.

Full Judgment

ORDER

Narain Singh 'Azad', J.

1. Petitioner's Supurdgi application under Section 451 of the Cr. P. C., stood disallowed by C.J.M., Narsinghpur, on 7-3-2000, and the petitioner remained unsuccessful on 2-6-2002, in his Criminal Revision No. 33/2000, also wherein, his challenge to the order dated 7-3-2000, passed by C.J.M., stood negatived by Special Judge (Atrocities), Narsinghpur, therefore, he seeks quashment of both the aforesaid orders and interim custody of his Armada Jeep, bearing No. M.P. 19-A/3322, in exercise of inherent powers.

2. It is found detailed by Revisional Court in its order dated 2-6-2002, that on 10-9-99, a patrolling party of Forest Officers intercepted Armada Jeep bearing No. M. P. 19-A/3322, on National Highway No. 12, near Tendukheda, while coming from Peepar-wani, who on search found that Shivraj, father of this petitioner, Beni Singh and Ashok Kumar were occupying the seats. These Forest Officers found fresh pieces of flesh in a bundle and some cooked flesh also in steel tiffen. On enquiry, it was learnt that one spotted Deer was killed and some of its flesh was cooked at the residence of Hemraj, resident of village Peeparwani, and the rest of the flesh was being taken in the Jeep. The Forest Officials registered a P.O.R., for offences punishable Under Sections 9, 39B, 39D, 51(2) and 54(4) of Wild Life (Profession)1 Act, and arrested the accused persons. They further seized the jeep, the cooking utensils and the flesh found in the jeep. Arjun Singh, who claims to be the registered owner of the vehicle, filed a Supurdgi application in the Court of C.J.M. Narsinghpur, which stood rejected on the grounds that the vehicle is already confiscated by D. P.O. Narsinghpur.

3. The petitioner who is the registered owner of the jeep; claims the interim custody on the strength of Madhukar Rao v. State of M. P., reported in (2000) 1 MPLJ 289, wherein, it is dictated by a Full Bench of this Court in para 23 at page 299 that--

'We hold that any property including Vehicle seized on accusation or suspicion of commission of an offence under the Act can, on relevant grounds and circumstances be released by the Magistrate pending trial in accordance with Section 50(4) read with Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. We also hold that mere seizure of any property including vehicle on the charge of commission of an offence would not make the property to be of the State Government under Section 39(1)(d) of the Act.'

It is also found explained by the Full Bench that--

'In order that the seized property may be treated as property of the State, there should be a finding by the competent Court that vehicle seized has been used for committing an offence, The property seized under Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act for an alleged offender cannot become property of the State under Clause (d) of Section 39(1) unless there is a trial and a finding reached by the competent Court that the Property was used for committing an offence under the Act.'

4. Since the criminal case in respect of aforesaid P.O.R. is not disposed of, therefore, so far there is no finding of competent Court on the fact that the vehicle seized has been used for committing an offence, therefore, on mere conclusion of confiscation proceeding by D.F.O. Narsinghpur, on 18-10- 99, which is stated to have resulted in forfeiture of petitioner's jeep, does not by itself take away the Jurisdiction of learned C.J.M. Narsinghpur, in considering petitioner's application of interim custody. Consequently, the order, dated 7-3-2000, passed by C.J.M. Narsinghpur, on petitioner's Supurdgi application so also order dated 2.-6-2000, passed by Special Judge (Atrocities), Narsinghpur, in petitioner's Criminal Revision No. 33/2000, are set aside and the C.J.M. Narsinghpur, is directed to dispose of the petitioner's Supurdgi application afresh, in the light of the aforesaid legal position.

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