Bapulal Vs. Chunnilal

Bapulal vs Chunnilal

Disposition Petition dismissed Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Jul 04, 2005

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/511235
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge: A.M. Sapre, J.
Decided On: Jul 04, 2005
Case Number: C.R. No. 273 of 2004
Subject: Civil
Disposition: Petition dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive defi...

Key legal issue: Civil
Outcome / disposition: Petition dismissed
Acts & sections: Provincial Small Cause Court Act - Sections 9 and 25; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Sections 115

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Bapulal

Respondent

Chunnilal

Legal References

Acts: Provincial Small Cause Court Act - Sections 9 and 25; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Sections 115
Cases Referred: Rajeshwar v. Dashrath
Reported In: IV(2006)BC19; 2005(4)MPLJ200

Excerpt

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........three eminent judges of nagpur bench of which one member (vivian bose, j.) later became chief justice of this court and then judge of supreme court. in the words of their lordships:per full bench - there should be no interference on a question of fact or of law, even though the decision may appear to be erroneous unless the conclusion of the small cause court is one which no judge acting judicially could reasonably reach. in the words of vivian bose, j.the court of revision is not there to set right errors of either law or fact in the lower court but merely to see whether there has been a fair and proper trial according to standards which obtain in courts of justice, ignoring petty errors in procedure and trivial technicalities, and to see whether a judicial mind could have arrived at the conclusion reached. all else is foreign to a revision.a revising authority cannot interfere with the decision of a lower court on a point like limitation unless the error is so gross that no judicial mind could have reached it, as for example, when a lower court refuses to be bound by a decision of its own high court or of the privy council, or refuses to follow a plainly worded section in an act about which there could be no reasonable difference of judicial opinion. the test for seeing whether a decision is according to law is not whether the high court, or the particular judge presiding over the court in revision would have reached the same conclusion, but whether a judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached it. if he could, then the decision is according to law and the high court cannot interfere. if he could not, then the case is opened up and the high court is bound to interfere and itself to decide 'according to law,' that is to say, to decide just as it would if it were sitting in appeal. the word 'may' used in section 25 is not permissive. it has the force of 'shall'. the high court's powers are wider on facts than in second appeal, because the high court.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

A.M. Sapre, J.

1. This is a revision filed by the plaintiff against an appellate order dated 16.4.2004 passed by III Addl. District Judge, Mandsaur, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 814 was dismissed. This revision is, therefore, filed Under Section 9 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act read with Section 115 of C.P.C.

2. Having gone through the impugned judgment under challenge, I find absolutely no case to interfere. I can do no better except to quote the decision rendered by Nagpur High Court in the case of Rajeshwar v. Dashrath AIR 1943 Nag. 117. It is in this case their Lordships made following observations constituting full Bench consisted of three eminent Judges of Nagpur Bench of which one member (Vivian Bose, J.) later became Chief Justice of this Court and then Judge of Supreme Court. In the words of Their Lordships:

Per Full Bench - There should be no interference on a question of fact or of law, even though the decision may appear to be erroneous unless the conclusion of the Small Cause Court is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably reach.

In the words of Vivian Bose, J.

The Court of revision is not there to set right errors of either law or fact in the lower Court but merely to see whether there has been a fair and proper trial according to standards which obtain in Courts of justice, ignoring petty errors in procedure and trivial technicalities, and to see whether a judicial mind could have arrived at the conclusion reached. All else is foreign to a revision.

A revising authority cannot interfere with the decision of a lower Court on a point like limitation unless the error is so gross that no judicial mind could have reached it, as for example, when a lower Court refuses to be bound by a decision of its own High Court or of the Privy Council, or refuses to follow a plainly worded section in an Act about which there could be no reasonable difference of judicial opinion. The test for seeing whether a decision is according to law is not whether the High Court, or the particular Judge presiding over the Court in revision would have reached the same conclusion, but whether a Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached it. If he could, then the decision is according to law and the High Court cannot interfere. If he could not, then the case is opened up and the High Court is bound to interfere and itself to decide 'according to law,' that is to say, to decide just as it would if it were sitting in appeal. The word 'may' used in Section 25 is not permissive. It has the force of 'shall'. The High Court's powers are wider on facts than in second appeal, because the High Court can interfere even on facts if the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. On the Other hand the High Court's powers on questions of law are much narrower because unlike on appeal, the High Court cannot decide the issues, however, erroneous it may appear to be to the Judge hearing the revision, unless the decision is not 'according to law'.

3. As is clear it is in this case Their Lordships held by laying down the law that finding or fact of law can be set aside provided it is shown that no judicial man can ever reach to such conclusion. Their Lordships went to the extent of holding that even a wrong finding on fact/law can not be set aside unless it is shown that no Judge acting judicially could reasonably reach.

4. No such case is made out because finding recorded by the Trial Court in exercise of its original powers as Small Cause Court on facts cannot be said to be either perverse or illegal.

5. As observed supra, the suit is for recovery of Rs. 812. The learned trial Judge has rightly dismissed the suit by disbelieving the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff. It was held and in my opinion rightly that the case set up by the plaintiff appears to be unnatural and false. All these findings are pure findings of fact and revisionary Court cannot interfere in such finding of fact which is capable of being recorded by any Small Cause Court. Revision thus fails and is dismissed.

Same Court & Year Madhya Pradesh · 2005 Same Parties Bapulal vs Chunnilal Same Subject Civil Same Judge A.M. Sapre, J. Acts & Sections Provincial Small Cause Court Act - Sections 9 and 25; Code of...

Civil