Lalita Devi Vs. Laxminarayan

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture.....abhay gohil, j.1. heard.family court has dismissed application of the appellant under section 27 of the hindu marriage act, 1955 on the ground that no proceedings under hindu marriage act are pending between the parties. the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent husband had filed petition for divorce and that petition has been decreed by the family court and in that petition he had not filed any such application under section 27 of the hindu marriage act.2. from the perusal of the provision of section 27, it is clear that the application under section 27 is not maintainable independently. as per section 27 in any pending proceeding under this act the court may make such provisions in the decree as it deems just and proper with respect to any property presented, at or about the time of marriage. the impugned order passed by family court appears to be justified, as under section 27 of the act no such independent application is maintainable. thus, we do not find any illegality in the order passed by the family court. however, the appellant is free to avail the remedy available to her under the law.accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.