Dr. Mrunalini Devi Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax and ors.

Dr. Mrunalini Devi vs Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax and ors.

Type Court Judgment Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Mar 02, 2000

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/511116
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Decided On: Mar 02, 2000
Case Number: Misc. Petn. No. 433 of 1989 2 March 2000
Subject: Direct Taxation

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Counsels: J W. Mahajan, for the Petitioner R.L. Jain, for the Respondents Head Note: INCOME TAX CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Writ--MAINTAINABILITYAlternative remedy available by way of appeal Catch Note: Assessee filed writ for quashing notice issued for reassessment on the ground that notice did not disclose ground to i...

Key legal issue: Direct Taxation

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Dr. Mrunalini Devi

Advocate J W. Mahajan, <i>for the Petitioner</i> R.L. Jain, <i>for the Respondents</i>

Respondent

Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax and ors.

Legal References

Reported In: (2000)161CTR(MP)339

Excerpt

.....and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. in the process of manufacturing of..........the reasons disclosed in the memo annexure-r did not provide for a ground to initiate proceedings for reassessment under section 17(l)(a) of the act. it was further contended that the proposed reassessment was barred by limitation, as provided by section 17a of the act.4. respondents have filed return in oppugnation of the averments made in the petition. a preliminary objection is taken as to the tenability of this petition on the ground of existence of alternative remedy.5. having heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their pleadings and the documents filed therewith, i am satisfied that this petition should fail on the ground of non-exhaustion of the statutory remedy available to the petitioner- the petition is premature inasmuch as the petitioner has come before this court at the very threshold of the issuance of show-cause notice. it is amusing to note that petitioner having filed returns in reply to the impugned notices, has instead of waiting for the final result, rushed to this court under article 226/227.6. hon'ble the supreme court in labh chand's case air 1994 sc 7154 has held'when a siatutory forum or tribunal is specially created by a statute for redressal of specified grievances of persons on certain matters, the high court should not normally permit such persons to ventilate their specified grievances before it by entertaining petitions under article 226 of the constitution is a legal position which is too well settled,'7. in nathmal's case air 1964 sc 1419. the apex court dealing with the question as to how the discretionary jurisdiction of a high court under article 226 of the constitution was required to be exercised respecting a petition filed thereunder by a person coming before it bypassing a statutory alternative remedy available to him for obtaining redressal of his grievance ventilated in the petition, has held :'the jurisdiction of the high court under article 226 of the constitution is couched in wide terms and the.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

N.K. Jain, J

This is a petition by an assessee filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of appropriate writ for quashing 4 notices dated 23-3-1987, (Annexures-I, J, K & Q, issued by the Asstt. CWT, Indore (Respondent No. 1) under section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').

2. It may be noted at the outset that the petitioner-assessee has in response to the said notices filed returns for the said reassessment undertaken by respondent No. 1, under section 17(l)(a) of the Act. During those reassessment proceedings an application was filed by the petitioner seeking disclosure of the reasons for which the reassessment was being undertaken by the assessing authority. In reply to the said application the assessing authority issued a memo dated 2nd March, 1989 (Annexure-B) stating that the reason being the assessment order for the year 1982-83 according to which it had come to notice that certain wealth with the assessee has escaped assessment for the years 1978-79 to 1981-82.

3. The petitioner has assailed the notices Annexures-1, J, K and L; as ab initio void and without jurisdiction. It was contended that the reasons disclosed in the memo Annexure-R did not provide for a ground to initiate proceedings for reassessment under section 17(l)(a) of the Act. It was further contended that the proposed reassessment was barred by limitation, as provided by section 17A of the Act.

4. Respondents have filed return in oppugnation of the averments made in the petition. A preliminary objection is taken as to the tenability of this petition on the ground of existence of alternative remedy.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their pleadings and the documents filed therewith, I am satisfied that this petition should fail on the ground of non-exhaustion of the statutory remedy available to the petitioner- The petition is premature inasmuch as the petitioner has come before this court at the very threshold of the issuance of show-cause notice. It is amusing to note that petitioner having filed returns in reply to the impugned notices, has instead of waiting for the final result, rushed to this court under Article 226/227.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Labh Chand's case AIR 1994 SC 7154 has held

'When a siatutory forum or Tribunal is specially created by a statute for redressal of specified grievances of persons on certain matters, the High Court should not normally permit such persons to ventilate their specified grievances before it by entertaining petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution is a legal position which is too well settled,'

7. In Nathmal's case AIR 1964 SC 1419. the apex court dealing with the question as to how the discretionary jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was required to be exercised respecting a petition filed thereunder by a person coming before it bypassing a statutory alternative remedy available to him for obtaining redressal of his grievance ventilated in the petition, has held :

'The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary-, it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self imposed limitations Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another Tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.'

8. It is true, that there may be a case where the High Court may be justified in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 even before exhaustion of alternative remedy. The existence of an alternative remedy may not be a ground for refusing writ of mandamus or cerdorari where it appears on the face of the proceedings that the inferior Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or contrary to the fundamental principles of justice. Although in the instant case the petitioner has severely attacked the validity of the show-cause notices, these notices cannot be termed as illegal per se or without jurisdiction. The petitioner having already submitted returns should wait for the final outcome of those assessments. The Act of 1957 provides a complete code for redressal of grievances of the assessee inasmuch as the orders passed by the assessing officer can be challenged in appeal firstly before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and then before the Tribunal under sections 21 and 24 of the Act. There is also provision for revision by the CWT and reference can also be made to this court on law points.

9. In the result I decline interference and dismiss the petition leaving the petitioner free to have recourse to the provisions of the Act of 1957 for redressal of his grievances. The stay granted earlier shall also stand vacated. No order as to costs

Same Court & Year Madhya Pradesh · 2000 Same Parties Dr. Mrunalini Devi vs Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax an... Same Subject Direct Taxation

Direct Taxation