Ashok Vs. Ashok Thakur and ors.

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........in view of section 140 of the act, the tribunal has not to probe the issue with detailed enquiry. it is to ascertain whether motor vehicle was involved in the said accident and whether the claimant has made out a prima facie case of permanent disability. in view of section 142 of the act, the claimant should not be asked to lead the evidence to the point of proving the fact required in any litigation, for final verdict to be given. that much of evidence is not necessary while disposing of an application connected with section 140 of the act, of claimant made to the tribunal in respect of a claim in which motor vehicle is involved in the accident. the tribunal has to dispose of such application in spirit in which sections 140 and 142 of the act have been enacted.5. i find substance in the submission made on behalf of opponent no. 3 by shri chawla that some claimants deliberately delay the hearing of such cases for the purpose of earning more interest. shri rajpal has submitted that the present claimant is not interested in delaying the matter. it has been pointed that the matter has been fixed for recording of evidence on 24.3.95. shri rajpal for petitioner has also expressed his desire to lead evidence before the tribunal as early as possible and to get it decided as early as possible. therefore, the anxiety lingering in the mind of shri chawla, counsel for opponent no. 3 would be removed. both the contesting parties and the tribunal are directed to decide the claim expeditiously so as to avoid delay.6. in the result, the opponents, jointly and severally are directed to pay sum of rs. 12,000/- (rs. twelve thousand) to the petitioner within a month. if the said sum is not paid within a month, the petitioner would be entitled to get interest at the rate of 12% per annum on said amount till the said amount is paid c.c. on payment.