Ravinair Vs. State

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........of rs. 200/- in default to undergo further r.i. for 15 days. the defence of the applicant was innocence. on appeal, the conviction and sentence of the applicant was affirmed by the sessions judge.3. shri h.s. dubey, learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the applicant was not at all negligent in driving the offending truck; he took all precautions to stop the vehicle, but the boy suddenly came before the truck and therefore he could not stop the vehicle. the ingredients of section 304a ipc are not attracted and therefore the conviction and sentence of the appellant is bad in law. he also placed reliance in the case of mahadev hari lokre v. state of maharashtra : 1972 crilj49 .4. shri s.k. gangrade, penal laywer, has fairly conceded that this case is squarly covered by the decision of the apex court.5. on perusal of the judgment under revision, it is evident that when p.w. 2 lali bai had gone to fetch water from the public hydrain her grandson hariram was also following her, who was on the other side of the road. on seeing the truck p.w. 2 lali bai shouted at hariram not to cross the road, but the deceased did not stop and tried to cross the road and the driver could not stop the truck and the boy was crushed and died at the spot. in mahavev (supra) the apex court has observed that if a person suddenly crosses the road and the bus driver, however slowly driving, may not in a position to check the vehicle and therefore it will not be possible to hold that the bus driver was negligent. the decision in the case of mahadev (supra) squarly covers the instant case.6. therefore, the conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be sustained and accordingly it is set aside. in the result the revision is allowed.