Sukhlal Vs. Mahesh

Sukhlal vs Mahesh

Type Court Judgment Court Madhya Pradesh Decided May 10, 1995

~4 min read

https://sooperkanoon.com/case/510965

For advocates & juniors · 7-day free trial

Brief this judgment before chambers

Stop skimming 50 pages - get an 18-section AI Brief on this case, ask scoped follow-ups, and find related precedents with Semantic Search. Full trial, no card required.

18-section brief - facts, issues, ratio, relief
Ask this case - answers cite the judgment
Semantic search - find precedents by meaning
Research drawer - sections, cites, related cases

Citation: sooperkanoon.com/510965
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge: R.S. Garg, J.
Decided On: May 10, 1995
Subject: Insurance;Motor Vehicles

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive defi...

Key legal issue: Insurance;Motor Vehicles

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Sukhlal

Respondent

Mahesh

Legal References

Reported In: II(1995)ACC352

Excerpt

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........the respondent has also filed cross-objections under order 41 rule 22 c.p.c. alleging that the claims tribunal committed an error in giving award and proper opportunity of hearing was not given to the respondent nos. 1 and 2.2. the brief facts leading the appeal are, that on 26.5.1987 the appellant was going on his scooter alongwith dr. bhatnagar, the respondent no. 1 mahesh driving jeep no. wma-2674, rashly and negligently dashed the appellant's scooter as a consequence of which the appellant received grievous injuries on right leg. it was also alleged that the said jeep belong to original respondent no. 2. according to the appellant because of the injury' suffered by him he was lodged in hospital from 26.5.1987 to 16.7.1987 and from 16.8.1987 to 16.9.1987. according to the appellant he suffered grievous fracture in the right leg and a rod was implanted, he claimed rs. 4,50,800/- as compensation. despite service of the notice, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 did not appear, therefore, the case proceeded ex-parte against them and as they were ex-parte the insurance company could also not be impleaded. the learned trial court after examining the appellant and his witnesses passed the award in favour of the appellant for a sum of rs. 10,500/- holding that the respondent no. 1 was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently and the vehicle belongs to the respondent no. 2.3. the counsel for the appellant contended that the court below was wrong in awarding a meager sum of rs. 10,500/- despite sufficient material being available on record to show that the appellant had not only suffered the pains but would suffer the result of injury for ever. it was contended by him that the documents filed with application under order 41 rule 27 of c.p.c. would show that in the accident the appellant has suffered permanent disability and could walk with the assistance of crutches only. it was submitted by him that the documents need to be taken on record to do complete justice.....

Full Judgment

R.S. Garg, J.

1. The appellant Sukhlal has filed the present appeal under Section 110-D of Motor Vehicles Act for enhancement of the sum awarded to him in relation to the award dated 16.7.1990 passed in claim Case No. 9/88 by the learned IIIrd Additional Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chhindwara. The respondent has also filed cross-objections under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C. alleging that the Claims Tribunal committed an error in giving award and proper opportunity of hearing was not given to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

2. The brief facts leading the appeal are, that on 26.5.1987 the appellant was going on his scooter alongwith Dr. Bhatnagar, the respondent No. 1 Mahesh driving Jeep No. WMA-2674, rashly and negligently dashed the appellant's scooter as a consequence of which the appellant received grievous injuries on right leg. It was also alleged that the said Jeep belong to original respondent No. 2. According to the appellant because of the injury' suffered by him he was lodged in hospital from 26.5.1987 to 16.7.1987 and from 16.8.1987 to 16.9.1987. According to the appellant he suffered grievous fracture in the right leg and a rod was implanted, he claimed Rs. 4,50,800/- as compensation. Despite service of the notice, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not appear, therefore, the case proceeded ex-parte against them and as they were ex-parte the Insurance Company could also not be impleaded. The learned Trial Court after examining the appellant and his witnesses passed the award in favour of the appellant for a sum of Rs. 10,500/- holding that the respondent No. 1 was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently and the vehicle belongs to the respondent No. 2.

3. The Counsel for the appellant Contended that the Court below was wrong in awarding a meager sum of Rs. 10,500/- despite sufficient material being available on record to show that the appellant had not only suffered the pains but would suffer the result of injury for ever. It was contended by him that the documents filed with application under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. would show that in the accident the appellant has suffered permanent disability and could walk with the assistance of crutches only. It was submitted by him that the documents need to be taken on record to do complete justice between the parties.

4. The respondents have filed the cross-objections and they have stated that no proper opportunity of hearing was extended to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and, therefore, the claim of the appellant be dismissed.

5. In my opinion the documents which have been filed by the appellant must be taken on record as they relate to the lodgment of the appellant in the hospital and also prima facie show the disability suffered by the appellant. The said documents are taken on record as additional evidence. As the said documents are taken on record as additional evidence, the same are required to be proved by adducing oral evidence and, therefore, the case needs to be remanded back to the Trial Court. At the same time it cannot be lost sight of cross-objections filed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The objection raised by them is that no proper opportunity of hearing was afforded to them. It would be in the fitness of the things that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are given an opportunity to contest the claim lodged by the appellant. It would also be proper in view of the facts that the matter has been remanded to the Trial Court for recording the evidence.

6. The documents filed with the application be remitted to the Trial Court along with the original record as the same are required to be proved in accordance with law. At the same time it is also made clear that the Trial Court would try the matter de-novo. The evidence already recorded in the case would only be taken into consideration if both the parties consent for its consideration.

7. The appeal and the cross-objection are accordingly allowed. The matter is remanded back to the Trial Court with the direction that it would try the matter de-novo after issuing fresh summons to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The Registry is directed to remit the original record and all the documents filed with I.A. No. 1129/91 dated 20.2.1991. The appellant shall appear before the Trial Court on 22.6.1995.

Same Court & Year Madhya Pradesh · 1995 Same Parties Sukhlal vs Mahesh Same Subject Insurance;Motor Vehicles Same Judge R.S. Garg, J.

Insurance;Motor Vehicles