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Shanti Devi Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

Shanti Devi vs State of Madhya Pradesh

Type Court Judgment Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Jan 10, 2001
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/510939

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Citation
Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Criminal Appeal No. 1018 of 1989
Subject
Family;Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive defi...

Key legal issue
Family;Criminal
Acts & sections
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 307 and 324

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Shanti Devi

Respondent

State of Madhya Pradesh

Legal References

Acts
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 307 and 324
Reported In
II(2001)DMC417

Excerpt

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........it was necessary for the husband to explain the injuries suffered by the appellant-wife. thus, it appears that the genesis of the incident has been suppressed by the prosecution. ramawati (p.w. 8) in her deposition has stated that she had not witnessed the incident and she woke up when her father cried. ramjeetram (p.w. 6) had come to the spot subsequently and so also kunwar singh (p.w. 5). injury found on the person of dharamdeo does not indicate that any artery was cut. it is not made out from the deposition of dharamdeo that the appellant's intention was to cause death. as a matter of fact, it is a case where an altercation has taken place between the husband and wife in which wife was severely beaten as a result of which she suffered certain injuries and it appears that the husband also suffered injuries by a sharp-edged weapon like gandasa. thus, an offence under section 324,1.p.c. is made out and not under section 307,1.p.c. the appellant has already undergone about 4 months jail sentence. the incident took place in the year 1987. there was a dispute in the matrimonial house and partners. it has come in evidence that the husband used to beat wife and the wife was beaten at the time of the incident also. thus, taking overall circumstances including lapse of time and strained relationship between the parties, the sentence of imprisonment suffered by the appellant is held to be sufficient.8. the appeal is partly allowed. the conviction of the appellant is converted from 307, i.p.c. to 324, i.p.c. and she is sentenced to imprisonment already undergone. the appellant is on bail. her bail bonds are discharged.

Full Judgment

Arun Mishra, J.

1. The present appeal has been preferred by Smt. Shanti Devi aggrieved by her conviction under Section 307, I.P.C. She has been sentenced to three years' R.I.

2. A quarrel took place between the husband and wife. Appellant is the wife. It appears that the appellant-wife was beaten and suffered injuries at the hands of the husband as is apparent from the injury reports Exhibits P-4 of wife and P-5 of injured husband. Appellant Smt. Shanti Devi is the wife of injured Dharamdeo. According to the prosecution case, altercation took place between husband and wife on 15.11.1987 in the night at 2 a.m. at Govindpura, Bhopal. Husband and wife both used to excuse each other of bad character. A divorce case was filed in which a compromise was entered into. However, differences continued even after they started living together. Dharamdeo's assurance of good behaviour proved futile. Incident of beating took place on two occasions. The prosecution alleges that the appellant-Shanti Devi, with an intention to kill her husband and get rid of situation caused injury to her husband in the night with a Gandasa, a sharp-edged weapon.

The accused-appellant abjured the guilt and contended that her husband tried to inflict knife injury on her. She tried to save her and in such scuffle, injury was sustained by her husband.

3. Injury report Ex. P-4 disclosed that appellant-wife was medically examined on 15.11.1987 at 7.35 p.m. There were following injuries :

(1) Haematoma, 2' x 1' with swelling, diff. abrasions over the right thenar eminance, cold and dark in colour.

(2) Haematoma 2' x 1' over the right dethro.

The injury was on the shoulder due to which she was unable to move her hand and there was swelling on the palm and thumb.

4. It is mentioned in the requisition that there was altercation between the husband and the wife and both suffered injuries during altercation.The injury report of Dharamdeo shows; that there was a linear abrasion on the anterior end of first injury which was an incised wound on the right neck on super scapular region, oblique in direction, slightly 3' above and middle of clavicle to posteriorly 6' x 3' x 1' muscle deep. Bleeding was present. Another injury was a linear abrasion. Both the injuries were caused by sharp-edged weapon.

5. In the present appeal, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that it is a case where the prosecution has not come with correct story of the case. Injuries found on the person of the accused-appellant have not been explained. In the initial injury report, the Doctor has not opined that the injury was dangerous to life. Doctor has opined that if the injury was not treated, it could be dangerous. It was his subsequent opinion sought by the police that injury was referred to as may have been dangerous but for treatment.

6. Learned Counsel for the State has submitted that the conviction and sentence call for no interference in the present appeal.

7. The deposition of Dharamdeo (P.W. 7) does not disclose the full truth. He has not explained the injuries found on the person of Shanti Devi, the appellant. The police has mentioned in the medical requisition of Shanti Devi that certain injuries were suffered by her in the altercation between the husband and wife in the circumstances, it was necessary for the husband to explain the injuries suffered by the appellant-wife. Thus, it appears that the genesis of the incident has been suppressed by the prosecution. Ramawati (P.W. 8) in her deposition has stated that she had not witnessed the incident and she woke up when her father cried. Ramjeetram (P.W. 6) had come to the spot subsequently and so also Kunwar Singh (P.W. 5). Injury found on the person of Dharamdeo does not indicate that any artery was cut. It is not made out from the deposition of Dharamdeo that the appellant's intention was to cause death. As a matter of fact, it is a case where an altercation has taken place between the husband and wife in which wife was severely beaten as a result of which she suffered certain injuries and it appears that the husband also suffered injuries by a sharp-edged weapon like Gandasa. Thus, an offence under Section 324,1.P.C. is made out and not under Section 307,1.P.C. The appellant has already undergone about 4 months jail sentence. The incident took place in the year 1987. There was a dispute in the matrimonial house and partners. It has come in evidence that the husband used to beat wife and the wife was beaten at the time of the incident also. Thus, taking overall circumstances including lapse of time and strained relationship between the parties, the sentence of imprisonment suffered by the appellant is held to be sufficient.

8. The appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is converted from 307, I.P.C. to 324, I.P.C. and she is sentenced to imprisonment already undergone. The appellant is on bail. Her bail bonds are discharged.

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