Hari Singh Vs. State of M.P.

Hari Singh vs State of M.P.

Type Court Judgment Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Oct 22, 1995

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/510742
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge: T.S. Doabia, J.
Decided On: Oct 22, 1995
Subject: Insurance;Motor Vehicles

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(f): [Dipak Misra, K.K. Lahoti & Rajendra Menon, JJ] Service Tax - Packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of Section 2(f) of Central Excise Act 1944? Finance Act 932 of 1994), Section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - Held, The first limb of the inclusive defi...

Key legal issue: Insurance;Motor Vehicles

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Hari Singh

Respondent

State of M.P.

Legal References

Reported In: 2(1996)ACC37

Excerpt

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........concluded that in appropriate cases it is possible to give relief in accident cares in writ jurisdiction as well. a further direction was given to the district judge, gwalior, to hold an enquiry into the matter with regard to determination of the factual position as to whether the buffalo in question had, in fact, died on account of the electric shock sustained as alleged by the petitioner. the report has since been submitted. the district judge, gwalior, in his report dated 6th september, 1995 has concluded that the buffalo belonging to the petitioner died on account of the electric shock suffered by it from the leakage of current through the electric wire. the learned district judge has placed reliance on the statement of the petitioner, harisingh, and also of the doctor, who performed the post-mortem of the buffalo on 11.8.1995. the evidence of the board was discarded on the ground that one of the witnesses viz., d.w. 1 v.p. singh had visited the spot only on 13th september, 1995, i.e. more than a month after the occurrence. so far as the other witness dw 2 is concerned, cogent reasons have been given for not placing reliance on the statement given by him in court. as such i accept the report submitted by the learned district judge and the finding of fact recorded therein that the buffalo in question died on account of the electric shock is accepted.2. the question with regard to the quantum of compensation for the loss of buffalo in question may now be examined. in the writ petition claim has been made to the extent of rs. 20,000/-. this amount represents the price of the buffalo. the interest at the rate of 18% per annum has also been claimed. the assertion of the petitioner with regard to the price of the buffalo has been denied by the board. it be seen that the learned district judge has not examined this issue regarding the price of the buffalo and he has confined only to the question as to whether the accident did take place or not ?3. a perusal of the.....

Full Judgment

T.S. Doabia, J.

1. This order may be read in continuation of the order passed by me on 5th September, 1995. In the said order I had concluded that in appropriate cases it is possible to give relief in accident cares in writ jurisdiction as well. A further direction was given to the District Judge, Gwalior, to hold an enquiry into the matter with regard to determination of the factual position as to whether the buffalo in question had, in fact, died on account of the electric shock sustained as alleged by the petitioner. The report has since been submitted. The District Judge, Gwalior, in his report dated 6th September, 1995 has concluded that the buffalo belonging to the petitioner died on account of the electric shock suffered by it from the leakage of current through the electric wire. The learned District Judge has placed reliance on the statement of the petitioner, Harisingh, and also of the doctor, who performed the post-mortem of the buffalo on 11.8.1995. The evidence of the Board was discarded on the ground that one of the witnesses viz., D.W. 1 V.P. Singh had visited the spot only on 13th September, 1995, i.e. more than a month after the occurrence. So far as the other witness DW 2 is concerned, cogent reasons have been given for not placing reliance on the statement given by him in Court. As such I accept the report submitted by the learned District Judge and the finding of fact recorded therein that the buffalo in question died on account of the electric shock is accepted.

2. The question with regard to the quantum of compensation for the loss of buffalo in question may now be examined. In the writ petition claim has been made to the extent of Rs. 20,000/-. This amount represents the price of the buffalo. The interest at the rate of 18% per annum has also been claimed. The assertion of the petitioner with regard to the price of the buffalo has been denied by the Board. It be seen that the learned District Judge has not examined this issue regarding the price of the buffalo and he has confined only to the question as to whether the accident did take place or not ?

3. A perusal of the record and particularly the photographs (Annexure P/3) does indicate that the buffalo was of full grown size and was very healthy. Normally, the price for milch cattle of the shape and size which is apparent from Annexure P/3 would be quite high but not as claimed by the petitioner. As such it would be just and proper to assess, the price of the buffalo at Rs. 12,000/-. The accident took place on 10.8.1995. The petitioner has been deprived of the profits which he would have derived from the sale of the milk for three months. Even if it be presumed that the buffalo was giving 8 litres of milk per day, the sale consideration would come to around Rs. 80/-. If Rs. 30/- is taken as minimum profit then the loss every month would be for Rs. 900/-. For three months this loss would be of Rs. 2,700/-. The petitioner would also be entitled to this loss of profit which is fixed at Rs. 2,000/-. The petitioner would thus be entitled to Rs. 14,000/-.

4. A direction was given in the order dated 5.9.1995 that the interim compensation be paid to the extent of Rs. 7,500/-. This has not been paid. The respondent/Board, would, therefore, pay Rs. 14,000/- to the petitioner. Let this be done within a period of fifteen days. If the payment is not made within a period of fifteen days then the petitioner would be entitled to the interest at the rate of 12%. This petition is allowed accordingly.

Same Court & Year Madhya Pradesh · 1995 Same Parties Hari Singh vs State of M.P. Same Subject Insurance;Motor Vehicles Same Judge T.S. Doabia, J.

Insurance;Motor Vehicles