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Sarojbai and ors. Vs. Subhash Chander and ors.

Sarojbai and ors. vs Subhash Chander and ors.

Disposition Appeal dismissed Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Jan 12, 1998
~2 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/509017

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Citation
Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
M.A. No. 350 of 1997
Subject
Motor Vehicles
Disposition
Appeal dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MADHYA PRADESH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT (23 OF 1956)Section 91 & M.P. Municipal Corporation Act (1956), Section 307(5): [A.K. Patnaik, C.J., A.M. Sapre & S.K.Seth, JJ] Public nuisance - Suit for injunction - Held, Section 91(I) of the C.P.C. is not exhaustive of the remedies that are available to a party e...

Key legal issue
Motor Vehicles
Outcome / disposition
Appeal dismissed

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Sarojbai and ors.

Advocate N.D. Singhal, Adv.

Respondent

Subhash Chander and ors.

Advocate M.P. Agarwal, Adv.

Legal References

Reported In
II(1999)ACC267; 1999ACJ398

Excerpt

- madhya pradesh municipal corporation act (23 of 1956)section 91 & m.p. municipal corporation act (1956), section 307(5): [a.k. patnaik, c.j., a.m. sapre & s.k.seth, jj] public nuisance - suit for injunction - held, section 91(i) of the c.p.c. is not exhaustive of the remedies that are available to a party even in case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting or likely to affect the public. the remedy of the corporation and any other person under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is independent of the provisions of section 91 of the c.p.c. and not only the corporation but any other person can apply to the district court for injunction or removal or alteration of a building on the ground that the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye-laws made thereunder have been contravened. sections 41(j) & 4 & m.p. municipal corporation act (1956), section 307(5): [a.k. patnaik, c.j., a.m. sapre & s.k. seth, jj] relief of injunction held, the reliefs under the specific relief act, 1963 are granted for the purpose of enforcing individual civil rights as will be clear from section 4 of the specific relief act. 1963. accordingly, injunction under part iii of the specific relief act, 1963 is granted to the plaintiff either to prevent a breach of an obligation in favour of the plaintiff, or to compel the performance of an obligation in his favour. unless, therefore, there is an obligation in favour of the plaintiff which needs to be enforced, the court cannot grant injunction. hence, it is provided in section 41(j) of the specific relief act. 1963 that an injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. the provisions of the specific relief act, 1963 do not apply to the right conferred on the corporation and any other person under sub-section (5) of section 307 of m.p. municipal corporation act, 1956. under the provisions of the act of 1956, every building must comply with the provisions of the act.....shacheendra dwivedi and s.p. srivastava, jj.1. this appeal has been preferred under section 173 of the motor vehicles act, 1988, challenging the award to the extent of quantum of the amount of compensation, submitting that the learned tribunal has not allowed the proper compensation and has also wrongly directed the payment of the interest on the amount of compensation only at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.2. we have considered the forceful contentions advanced by learned counsel mr. n.d. singhal. the deceased, from the pay certificate, exh. p/2, was found to be receiving an amount of rs. 3,051 per month. the date of birth of the deceased was 3.7.1943, he had completed 44 years. learned tribunal, therefore, applied the multiplier of 13. the tribunal assessed the dependency of the claimants at rs. 26,889.60 per year. it was found that the claimants were entitled to rs. 3,49,564.80. learned tribunal further allowed rs. 10,000 and directed the payment of the total sum of rs. 3,59,564.80. learned tribunal granted the interest on the claimed amount at the rate of 6 per cent per annum in view of the prolonged period of pendency of the claim petition. the evidence of the claimants could only be closed on 21.3.1996, as such the claimants took eight years in closing their evidence. for the above circumstances the rate of interest was allowed only at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.3. we have considered the rival contentions and perused the record. learned tribunal has taken a reasonable view in awarding the compensation, in the facts and circumstances of the case on the assessment of the evidence. no illegality or perversity could be shown by the learned counsel for the appellants. the learned tribunal in its discretion on the consideration of the long pendency of the claim petition has allowed the interest less than 12 per cent. we have, therefore, found no merit in this appeal. the appeal is, therefore, summarily dismissed.

Full Judgment

Shacheendra Dwivedi and S.P. Srivastava, JJ.

1. This appeal has been preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, challenging the award to the extent of quantum of the amount of compensation, submitting that the learned Tribunal has not allowed the proper compensation and has also wrongly directed the payment of the interest on the amount of compensation only at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.

2. We have considered the forceful contentions advanced by learned Counsel Mr. N.D. Singhal. The deceased, from the pay certificate, Exh. P/2, was found to be receiving an amount of Rs. 3,051 per month. The date of birth of the deceased was 3.7.1943, he had completed 44 years. Learned Tribunal, therefore, applied the multiplier of 13. The Tribunal assessed the dependency of the claimants at Rs. 26,889.60 per year. It was found that the claimants were entitled to Rs. 3,49,564.80. Learned Tribunal further allowed Rs. 10,000 and directed the payment of the total sum of Rs. 3,59,564.80. Learned Tribunal granted the interest on the claimed amount at the rate of 6 per cent per annum in view of the prolonged period of pendency of the claim petition. The evidence of the claimants could only be closed on 21.3.1996, as such the claimants took eight years in closing their evidence. For the above circumstances the rate of interest was allowed only at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.

3. We have considered the rival contentions and perused the record. Learned Tribunal has taken a reasonable view in awarding the compensation, in the facts and circumstances of the case on the assessment of the evidence. No illegality or perversity could be shown by the learned Counsel for the appellants. The learned Tribunal in its discretion on the consideration of the long pendency of the claim petition has allowed the interest less than 12 per cent. We have, therefore, found no merit in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, summarily dismissed.

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