Longabai Vs. Prem Chand

Longabai vs Prem Chand

Disposition Revision allowed Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Sep 13, 2000

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/508788
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge: A.K. Mishra, J.
Decided On: Sep 13, 2000
Case Number: Civil Revision No. 635/98
Subject: Civil;Tenancy
Disposition: Revision allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 147; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Liability of Insurer - Third party insurance Held, The insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of Chapter XI of the Act, particularly Section 147 thereof. Thus, any person ot...

Key legal issue: Civil;Tenancy
Outcome / disposition: Revision allowed
Acts & sections: Evidence Act - Sections 116; Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 - Sections 32

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Longabai

Advocate K.K. Lahoti, Adv.

Respondent

Prem Chand

Advocate H.D. Gupta, Adv.

Legal References

Acts: Evidence Act - Sections 116; Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 - Sections 32
Cases Referred: Brij Mohan v. Dwarkadas
Reported In: 2000(4)MPHT340; 2001(2)MPLJ19

Excerpt

.....be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. an employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. but merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless section 147 of the act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. section 147 (1)(b) of the act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of chapter xi of the act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 147 of the act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1)of section 147 of the act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1`) of section 147 of the act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the workmens compensation act, 1923. [national insurance co. ltd. v sarvanlal, 2004 (4)..........the petitioner has strenuously submitted that it is a case based on the landlord, tenant relationship. bar or registration or question of registration is wholly foreign to the question to be tried in the suit between the landlord and the tenant. thus the order passed by the court below is contrary to the law laid down in the case of brijmohan v. dwarkadas, 1975 jlj sn 4, and on the case of kaduram v. mahila muthuri bai, in s.a. no. 139/79, decided on 1-1-80 decided by hon'ble justice h.g. mishra.3. learned counsel appearing for the respondent/defendant submitted that in a different suit the matter has been adjudicated with respect to the property being the trust property. as such the suit is not maintainable at the instance of the present plaintiff in view of the subsequent development. he has supported the reasonings employed by the trial court while passing the impugned order.4. after hearing learned counsel appearing for both the parties i am of the opinion that revision deserves to be allowed. in the case the plaintiff has come to the court with privity of contract that he has inducted the defendant as tenant in the premises, thus question of ownership is not directly involved in the case. in case the plaintiff has inducted the defendant as tenant and tenant has paid the rent suit is maintainable dehors the question of registration of trust. i am fortified in this view by the decision rendered in the case of kaduram (supra) in which it has been held :--'10. in order that a person may be regarded as landlord, it is not necessary that he should also be the owner of the property forming subject matter of the lease. concept of ownership and concept of landlordship are different. therefore, even if the suit premises belong to the idol, the suit for ejectment at the instance of the plaintiff-respondents alone is competent and the deity cannot file the suit on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant because it does not exist between them. this is what.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

A.K. Mishra, J.

1. Plaintiff has filed the present revision petition being aggrieved by the Order passed by learned Additional Civil Judge, Class-I, Bhind in Civil Original Suit No. 179-A/97, dated 28-4-98 whereby the plaintiff s suit filed for ejectment of the defendant/tenant has been stayed till the proceedings for registration of trust are not completed.

2. Shri K.K. Lahoti, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously submitted that it is a case based on the landlord, tenant relationship. Bar or registration or question of registration is wholly foreign to the question to be tried in the suit between the landlord and the tenant. Thus the Order passed by the Court below is contrary to the law laid down in the case of Brijmohan v. Dwarkadas, 1975 JLJ SN 4, and on the case of Kaduram v. Mahila Muthuri Bai, in S.A. No. 139/79, decided on 1-1-80 decided by Hon'ble Justice H.G. Mishra.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/defendant submitted that in a different suit the matter has been adjudicated with respect to the property being the trust property. As such the suit is not maintainable at the instance of the present plaintiff in view of the subsequent development. He has supported the reasonings employed by the trial Court while passing the impugned order.

4. After hearing learned counsel appearing for both the parties I am of the opinion that revision deserves to be allowed. In the case the plaintiff has come to the Court with privity of contract that he has inducted the defendant as tenant in the premises, thus question of ownership is not directly involved in the case. In case the plaintiff has inducted the defendant as tenant and tenant has paid the rent suit is maintainable dehors the question of registration of trust. I am fortified in this view by the decision rendered in the case of Kaduram (supra) in which it has been held :--

'10. In Order that a person may be regarded as landlord, it is not necessary that he should also be the owner of the property forming subject matter of the lease. Concept of ownership and concept of landlordship are different. Therefore, even if the suit premises belong to the idol, the suit for ejectment at the instance of the plaintiff-respondents alone is competent and the Deity cannot file the suit on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant because it does not exist between them. This is what flows from the following dictum of Shri Ram Pasaricha v. Jagannath (AIR 1976 SC 2335):

'It is only the landlord who can terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant.''11. The suit, as framed, is not and cannot be regarded to be one brought for enforcement of 'any right on behalf of the public trust' within the meaning of Section 32 of the M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951. What the section enacts is only a Bar to the trial of a suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust. The present suit is a suit simpliciter for enforcement of right of the plaintiffs as landlords. It is not within the prohibition enacted by the said section. I am fortified in the view I am taking by the ratio of Brij Mohan v. Dwarkadas (1975 JLJ SN 4), wherein A.P. Sen, J., (as he then was) has expressed himself on the point thus:

'The suit as framed, was not a suit brought by the plaintiff to enforce a right on behalf of public trust within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act. The plaintiffs suit is for enforcement of his right as a landlord. Therefore, the contention that the suit was barred under Section 32 cannot be accepted. Revision ismissed.'

Thus it can not be said that impugned Order is sustainable and interest of justice would not suffer if it is set aside.

The impugned Order is set aside. Trial Court is directed to proceed with the case on merits. Objections raised by the learned counsel for the defendant/respondent that there are subsequent developments. If there is any material subsequent development, having any bearing that has to be brought to the notice of the Court below which shall take the same into consideration and decide the suit expeditiously.

Revision is accordingly allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.

Same Court & Year Madhya Pradesh · 2000 Same Parties Longabai vs Prem Chand Same Subject Civil;Tenancy Same Judge A.K. Mishra, J. Acts & Sections Evidence Act - Sections 116; Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act,...

Civil;Tenancy