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Ghansu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

Ghansu vs State of Madhya Pradesh

Disposition Petition allowed Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Dec 02, 1998
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/508723

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Citation
Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Criminal Revn. No. 220 of 1994
Subject
Criminal;Food Adulteration
Disposition
Petition allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 147; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Liability of Insurer - Third party insurance Held, The insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of Chapter XI of the Act, particularly Section 147 thereof. Thus, any person ot...

Key legal issue
Criminal;Food Adulteration
Outcome / disposition
Petition allowed
Acts & sections
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - Sections 7(1), 13(2) and 16(1)

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Ghansu

Respondent

State of Madhya Pradesh

Advocate B.P. Singh

Legal References

Acts
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - Sections 7(1), 13(2) and 16(1)
Reported In
1999CriLJ2843

Excerpt

.....be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. an employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. but merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless section 147 of the act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. section 147 (1)(b) of the act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of chapter xi of the act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 147 of the act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1)of section 147 of the act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1`) of section 147 of the act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the workmens compensation act, 1923. [national insurance co. ltd. v sarvanlal, 2004 (4)..........dispatched. it purports to have been signed by the dy. director of khadya evam aoushadhi, mandla and not by the witness b.k. kachhwaha (p.w. 1). so his testimony that this intimation was sent by registered post appears to be made and based on the fact that copy of this letter and entry in the stamp register appears in the office of dy. director khadya and aoushadhi, mandla. this has to evidentiary value. even the person who had made the entry in the stamp register, has not appeared.4. a court of law cannot assume that if a copy of such letter exists on the record of the office, the letter must have been sent. there is no such presumption. the presumption that official course of business must have been followed, does not extend to the fact that when a copy of document is in official record, that copy's original, must have been sent to anybody to whom it has been addressed or must have reached there. the presumption of delivery of a particular letter arises in case of registered letter, only when it is established that the letter, with correct address, was given at the post office. that proof can come only from the postal receipts of the post office where the letter was tendered for onward delivery. if the postal receipt is lost, secondary evidence may be led or oral evidence, of tender at the post office, may be led. even the number of postal receipts whereby the letter was sent, is not mentioned in memo ex. p/14-c which is copy of stamp register regarding this letter.5. the contention of the counsel for the state is that b.k. kachhwaha (p.w. 1) made statement that the letter was sent and no cross-examination was directed on him, whatsoever. not a single question was asked. however, i find that when such a question was asked from the accused, he denied having received any such letter.6. it was for prosecution to establish that such a letter was tendered at some post office for delivery to the accused by registered post. this has not been established by statement.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

R.P. Gupta, J.

1. The present revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 12-4-94 of 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Mandla, in Cr. A. No. 92/83, whereby the conviction of the petitioner-accused for offence under Sections 7(1), 16(1)(a)(1) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, for selling adulterated milk to Food Inspector on 20-12-1982, in the area of village Manadehi, was confirmed.

2. The accused/petitioner has initially been convicted by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandla in Cr. Case No. 352/82, vide his judgment dated 23-11-83. He was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one year, but the Addl. Sessions Judge modified this sentence to Rigorous Imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default imprisonment for two months.

3. On perusal of the record, this Court finds that the revision petition must succeed on the ground that compliance of provisions of Section 13(2) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not established by the prosecution. The report of public analysis was dated 24-12-1981. A complaint was filed on 15-3-1982. According to the prosecution an intimation Ex. P/13 was issued to the appellant, along with the report of public analysis, to the accused from whom sample of cow milk had been taken. This letter purports to be dated 18-3-1982. It is an office copy about which statement has been made by the Food Inspector B.K. Kachhwaha (P.W. 1) that it was sent by registered post. A copy of stamp register of the office of Dy. Director (Up Sanchalak) Khadya Evam Aoushadhi Prashasnik, Mandla has been produced, containing the entry dated 19-3-1982. A letter was sent to this accused and stamp of Rs. 3.55 ps. was spent.

3A. B.K. Kachhwaha (P.W. 1) has not stated that the intimation, as copy of letter (Ex. P/13), was delivered by him or in his presence by anybody in the post office. The postal receipt by which this letter might have been sent, has not been produced on record. Nothing has been stated as to what happened to that postal letter. The acknowledgment due has also not been produced and nothing has been stated as to what has happened to the acknowledgment due and whether it has been returned to the accused by postal authorities. Witness B.K. Kachhwaha (P.W. 1) has not stated that he was in the office when this letter was dispatched. It purports to have been signed by the Dy. Director of Khadya Evam Aoushadhi, Mandla and not by the witness B.K. Kachhwaha (P.W. 1). So his testimony that this intimation was sent by registered post appears to be made and based on the fact that copy of this letter and entry in the stamp register appears in the office of Dy. Director Khadya and Aoushadhi, Mandla. This has to evidentiary value. Even the person who had made the entry in the stamp register, has not appeared.

4. A Court of law cannot assume that if a copy of such letter exists on the record of the office, the letter must have been sent. There is no such presumption. The presumption that official Course of business must have been followed, does not extend to the fact that when a copy of document is in official record, that copy's original, must have been sent to anybody to whom it has been addressed or must have reached there. The presumption of delivery of a particular letter arises in case of registered letter, only when it is established that the letter, with correct address, was given at the post office. That proof can come only from the postal receipts of the post office where the letter was tendered for onward delivery. If the postal receipt is lost, secondary evidence may be led or oral evidence, of tender at the post office, may be led. Even the number of postal receipts whereby the letter was sent, is not mentioned in memo Ex. P/14-C which is copy of stamp register regarding this letter.

5. The contention of the counsel for the State is that B.K. Kachhwaha (P.W. 1) made statement that the letter was sent and no cross-examination was directed on him, whatsoever. Not a single question was asked. However, I find that when such a question was asked from the accused, he denied having received any such letter.

6. It was for prosecution to establish that such a letter was tendered at some post office for delivery to the accused by registered post. This has not been established by statement of B.K. Kachhwaha (P.W. 1) or any other evidence on record.

7. I find that the mandatory provisions of Section 13(2) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, regarding sending of intimation about the public analysis report inviting the accused to take option in the Court regarding sending of any sample to Director of Khadya Evam Aoushadhi Prashasnik (CFL), have not been complied with. If the prosecution fails in doing so, it deprives the accused of an important safeguard and defence at that stage. Without such notice, the accused is not expected to move the Court for sending other part of sample to Director CFL, merely because he received the notice of the complaint filed against him by the Food Inspector.

8. Thus, there was basic infirmity in this prosecution and important defence of the accused was withheld, and so the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused. The revision petition therefore succeeds and is allowed. The conviction of accused/applicant is set aside. The applicant is acquitted of the charge. His bonds are discharged and the fine if paid by the applicant shall be refunded to him.

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