Dr. Rajendra Vs. Madhubala

Dr. Rajendra vs Madhubala

Disposition Appeal dismissed Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Sep 25, 1996

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/508473
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge: N.P. Singh, J.
Decided On: Sep 25, 1996
Case Number: Misc. Appeal No. 162 of 1994
Subject: Family
Disposition: Appeal dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 147; [A.K. Patnaik, CJ, S.S. Jha & A.M. Sapre, JJ] Liability of Insurer - Third party insurance Held, The insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of Chapter XI of the Act, particularly Section 147 thereof. Thus, any person ot...

Key legal issue: Family
Outcome / disposition: Appeal dismissed
Acts & sections: Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 - Sections 13 and 25

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Dr. Rajendra

Advocate G.C. Jain, Adv.

Respondent

Madhubala

Advocate K.M. Hajela and ;S.K. Seth, Advs.

Legal References

Acts: Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 - Sections 13 and 25
Reported In: I(1997)DMC400

Excerpt

.....be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. an employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. but merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless section 147 of the act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. section 147 (1)(b) of the act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of chapter xi of the act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 147 of the act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1)of section 147 of the act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1`) of section 147 of the act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the workmens compensation act, 1923. [national insurance co. ltd. v sarvanlal, 2004 (4)..........judge, family court, rewa in guardian case no. 12 of 1993, rejecting the petition of the appellant under section 25 of the guardians and wards act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as the' act' for restoration of the custody of his minor son.2. facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal, briefly stated, are that respondent no. 1 is the legally weded wife of the appellant and a son named manu was bom to her out of the wedlock with the appellant. after the birth of the son, respondent no. 1 went to her parents home to complete her studies in ayurvedic medicine and surgury leaving the boy with the appellant, who was taken care of by the appellant and his relations. when the boy was happily living with the appellant and getting education in sainik shishu niketan at rewa the respondent no. 1 moved an application under section 10 of the act before the district judge, farrukhabad for custody of the son on the ground that the appellant was living in adultery and the boy was not getting proper love and affection from the appellant and obtained an order for the custody of the child on 4.9.1992-thecustodyofthe boy was handed over to the respondent no. 1 pursuant to the order of the district judge, farrukhabad. sometimes thereafter the appellant moved an application under section 25 of the act on the ground that the boy was aged more than five years and he being the natural guardian of the boy, custody of the boy should be restored to him.3. the family court rejected the application on the ground that the appellant was intending to take a second wife, therefore, the boy was not likely to get proper love and affection from the appellant.4. mr. g.c. jain, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the family court has not considered the case in its proper legal perspective and has wrongly rejected the application on mere conjectures and surmises. the appellant has not kept any mistress nor he intends to take a second wife. the appellant is the natural.....

Full Judgment

N.P. Singh, J.

1. This appeal arises out of the order dated 14.2.1994 passed by the Presiding Judge, Family Court, Rewa in Guardian Case No. 12 of 1993, rejecting the petition of the appellant under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as the' Act' for restoration of the custody of his minor son.

2. Facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal, briefly stated, are that respondent No. 1 is the legally weded wife of the appellant and a son named Manu was bom to her out of the wedlock with the appellant. After the birth of the son, respondent No. 1 went to her parents home to complete her studies in Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgury leaving the boy with the appellant, who was taken care of by the appellant and his relations. When the boy was happily living with the appellant and getting education in Sainik Shishu Niketan at Rewa the respondent No. 1 moved an application under Section 10 of the Act before the District Judge, Farrukhabad for custody of the son on the ground that the appellant was living in adultery and the boy was not getting proper love and affection from the appellant and obtained an order for the custody of the child on 4.9.1992-Thecustodyofthe boy was handed over to the respondent No. 1 pursuant to the order of the District Judge, Farrukhabad. Sometimes thereafter the appellant moved an application under Section 25 of the Act on the ground that the boy was aged more than five years and he being the natural guardian of the boy, custody of the boy should be restored to him.

3. The Family Court rejected the application on the ground that the appellant was intending to take a second wife, therefore, the boy was not likely to get proper love and affection from the appellant.

4. Mr. G.C. Jain, learned Counsel for the appellant, has contended that the Family Court has not considered the case in its proper legal perspective and has wrongly rejected the application on mere conjectures and surmises. The appellant has not kept any mistress nor he intends to take a second wife. The appellant is the natural guardian of the boy as provided under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

5. Mr. Hajela, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, has contended that no appeal was preferred by the appellant against the order passed by the District Judge, Farrukhabad for handing over the custody of the boy to the respondent No. 1. The order of the District Judge has attained finality. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant before the Family Court at Rewa was not maintainable. He further contended that as this appeal has been preferred against as interim order passed by the Family Court, Rewa, die appeal is incompetent. The contention of Mr. Hajela is well founded.

6. It is admitted that no appeal was preferred by the appellant against the order passed by the District Judge, Farrukhabad for handing over the custody of the boy to the respondent No. 1. The order passed by the District Judge Farrukhabad is legal and valid and binding upon the appellant unless it is set aside by the Court of competent jurisdiction. The application made by the appellant before the Family Court at Rewa was obviously not maintainable.

7. Further under Section 13 of the Act, irrespective of the status of the person claiming guardianship (in this case father), the welfare of the child must be the paramount consideration in appointment and declaration of any person as guardian of the child. In the instant case, the boy is living happily with the respondent No. 1 (mother) and is getting love and affection and proper education.

8. For the reasons mentioned above, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. There is no merit in this appeal, it is dismissed accordingly. The appellant may visit his child as and when the desires.

Same Court & Year Madhya Pradesh · 1996 Same Parties Dr. Rajendra vs Madhubala Same Subject Family Same Judge N.P. Singh, J. Acts & Sections Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 - Sections 13 and 25

Family