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Cit Vs. Jai Kishan Gupta

Cit vs Jai Kishan Gupta

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Sep 23, 2003
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/492785

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Citation
Court
Allahabad High Court
Decided On
Case Number
Income Tax Reference No. 238 of 1983 23 September 2003
Subject
Direct Taxation

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Head Note: INCOME TAX WEALTH TAX Exemption under s. 5(1)(iv)--ONE HOUSE OR PART OF A HOUSE BELONGING TO ASSESSEECinema hall Catch Note: A cinema hall is not a building for human habitation or a dwelling or a house, therefore, a cinema hall is not a house at all, hence, not entitled to exemption under section 5(1)(iv...

Key legal issue
Direct Taxation

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Cit

Respondent

Jai Kishan Gupta

Legal References

Cases Referred
In Chapman v. Royal Bank of Scotland
Reported In
[2003]264ITR482(All)

Excerpt

.....v. tulsi dass (2002) 256 itr 73 (raj) dissented from. application: also to current assessment year. decision: in favour of revenue. constitution of india art 141 in the allahabad high court m. katju & umeshwar pandey, jj. - land acquisition act, 1894 [c.a. no. 1/1894]. section 4; [sushil harkauli, s.k. singh & krishna murari, jj] acquisition of land held, court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing the state authorities to acquire a particular land. land acquisition is not purely ministerial act to be performed by executive no direction in nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by court under article 226 necessarily to acquire particular land in public interest. land acquisition is not a purely ministerial act to be performed by the executive and therefore, no mandamus can be issued by the court in exercise of its power under article 226 of the constitution, whether suo motu or otherwise, whether in public interest litigation or otherwise directing acquisition of land under the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public.....m. katju, j.heard learned counsel for the parties.2. this is a wealth-tax reference under section 27(1) of the wealth tax act, 1957, in which the following question has been referred to us for our opinion :'whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the wealth tax act in respect of cinema building owned by this firm ?'3. the assessee is a firm and the relevant assessment years are 1974-75 to 1977-78. the assessee has 50 per cent share in the firm, jain kishan anand swarup, bulandshahr. the assets of the firm consist of a cinema building, and the question in this case is whether the assessee's 50 per cent share in the value of the cinema building is exempt from wealth-tax. the wealth tax officer rejected the claim of the assessee but the appellate assistant commissioner allowed his claim. the tribunal dismissed the second appeal filed by the department.4. the short question in this case is whether a cinema building can be treated to be a house for the purposes of section 5(1)(iv) of the wealth tax act. section 5(1)(iv) at the relevant time stated that the following asset shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee :'one house or part of a house belonging to the assessee.'the word 'house' has not been defined in the wealth tax act, nor in the general clauses act. however, the word 'building' has been used in section 5(1)(iii) of the wealth tax act, and in section 5(1)(i) the word 'property' has been used.thus the wealth tax act has used the words 'house', 'building' and 'property' in different places, and hence different meanings should ordinarily be ascribed to these words in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation. we, therefore, do not agree with learned counsel for the assessee that all buildings must be regarded as houses within the meaning of the term use in section 5(1)(iv).in common parlance a house means.....

Full Judgment

M. Katju, J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This is a wealth-tax reference under section 27(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, in which the following question has been referred to us for our opinion :

'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act in respect of cinema building owned by this firm ?'

3. The assessee is a firm and the relevant assessment years are 1974-75 to 1977-78. The assessee has 50 per cent share in the firm, Jain Kishan Anand Swarup, Bulandshahr. The assets of the firm consist of a cinema building, and the question in this case is whether the assessee's 50 per cent share in the value of the cinema building is exempt from wealth-tax. The Wealth Tax Officer rejected the claim of the assessee but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed his claim. The Tribunal dismissed the second appeal filed by the department.

4. The short question in this case is whether a cinema building can be treated to be a house for the purposes of section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act. Section 5(1)(iv) at the relevant time stated that the following asset shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee :

'One house or part of a house belonging to the assessee.'

The word 'house' has not been defined in the Wealth Tax Act, nor in the General Clauses Act. However, the word 'building' has been used in section 5(1)(iii) of the Wealth Tax Act, and in section 5(1)(i) the word 'property' has been used.

Thus the Wealth Tax Act has used the words 'house', 'building' and 'property' in different places, and hence different meanings should ordinarily be ascribed to these words in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation. We, therefore, do not agree with learned counsel for the assessee that all buildings must be regarded as houses within the meaning of the term use in section 5(1)(iv).

In common parlance a house means a place where people live. Of course a residential building can also be given for commercial purpose and yet it will remain a house. However, by no stretch of imagination can a cinema hall be regarded as a house. No one ever calls a cinema hall a house.

5. Learned counsel for the assessee has relied on the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in CWT v. Tulsi Dass , wherein it has been held that a cinema hall is a house. We respectfully disagree with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court. The Rajasthan High Court in that decision has held that for getting exemption under section 5(1)(iv) it is not necessary that the house be exclusively used for residential purposes. We agree with this reasoning of the Rajasthan High Court that even if a house is used for commercial purposes it will nevertheless remain a house which can claim exemption. However, if it is not a house at all in its inception then it cannot get exemption under section 5(1)(iv). There may be cases where a person uses or has given his residential house on rent, for commercial purpose but it will still remain a house, But if the building is not a house at all it cannot get exemption.

6. In New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'house' is defined as follows: 'a building for human habitation, a dwelling, a home'. In Legal Thesaurus by William C. Burton a house is defined as 'abode, dwelling place, home, habitation, living place, living quarters, residence, etc.'

7. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon (1997 edition), a house is defined as a place of dwelling or habitation.

In Chapman v. Royal Bank of Scotland (1881) 7 QB 136, it was held that a house means 'a permanent building in which the tenant, or the owner and his family, dwells or lives.'

8. The same interpretation has been given by our courts, e.g., in Shiv Narain Chaudhari v. CWT : [1977]108ITR104(All) ; CWT v. K. B. Pradhan : [1981]130ITR393(Orissa) , etc.

It may be mentioned that from the assessment years 1957-58 to 1971-72, it was one of the conditions for claiming exemption under section 5(1)(iv) that the house should be exclusively, used by the assessee for residential purpose. This condition was abrogated from 1972-73 by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971. However, this will only mean that after 1972 even if the assessee lets out his house on rent for residential or commercial purpose, or himself uses it for commercial purpose he will still get the exemption.

A cinema hall is not a building for human habitation or a dwelling or a home. Hence a cinema hall is not a house at all. To get exemption it must be a house in the first place, which a cinema hall is not. Hence, in our opinion, the assessee cannot get exemption under section 5(1)(iv).

9. For the reasons given above the reference is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessee,

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