Parmatma Prasad Vs. Cit

.....the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation. this is an income tax reference under section 256(2) of the income tax act, in which the following questions have been referred to us for our opinion :'1. whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income tax appellate tribunal was legally justified in holding the difference between the assessed income and the income returned, namely, rs. 12,000 as representing the applicants concealed income ?2. whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provisions of the explanation to section 271(1)(c) were correctly applied when the explanation to section 271(1)(c) was deleted with effect from 1-4-1976 ?3. whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income tax appellate tribunal was right in holding that the assessee had not discharged its burden within the meaning of explanation to section 271(1)(c) as it stood at the relevant time and whether there was any material for such a finding ?'2. we have carefully perused the appellate order of the tribunal and have heard learned counsel for the parties.3. the finding that assessee has not been able to discharge the burden under the explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the income tax act, is a finding of fact and we cannot interfere with the same in this reference. hence, the questions referred to us are decided in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessee.