Surendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. and ors.

.....the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation. .....and anti-social activities prevention) act, 1986, the impugned first information report registered under the provision of this very act for further offences was/is not permissible and that the only course left for the state is to lead evidence in regard to subsequent acts at the stage of trial of the earlier case.3. in our view sub-section (2) of section 8 is complete negation of the submission of mr. singh, which reads thus :-if in the course of any trial under this act of any offence, it is found that the accused has committed any other offence under this act, or any rule thereunder or under any other law, the special court may convict such person of such other offence and pass any sentence authorised by this act or such rule or, as the case may be, such other law, for the punishment thereof.4. it is clear from a bare perusal of the aforementioned provision that the legislature never desired a composite trial. it merely meant that if an accused has committed any other offence under the provisions of the act in course of any trial under the act of any offence the special court may convict such person of such other offence. if the subsequent offence under the act is, not registered, investigated, chargesheeted and the accused is not charged accordingly and straightway the trial of the subsequent offence under the act is clubbed with that of the earlier case in that case an accused may take recourse to prejudice or to the violation of the equality clause enshrined under article 14 of the constitution. we are of the view that the legislature has advisedly tried to avoid such a contingency.5. for the reasons aforementioned this writ petition is dismissed.