Mahendra NaraIn Singh and anr. Vs. Varanasi Development Authority and ors.

Mahendra NaraIn Singh and anr. vs Varanasi Development Authority and ors.

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Dec 13, 2002

~3 min read

https://sooperkanoon.com/case/487937

For advocates & juniors · 7-day free trial

Brief this judgment before chambers

Stop skimming 50 pages - get an 18-section AI Brief on this case, ask scoped follow-ups, and find related precedents with Semantic Search. Full trial, no card required.

18-section brief - facts, issues, ratio, relief
Ask this case - answers cite the judgment
Semantic search - find precedents by meaning
Research drawer - sections, cites, related cases

Citation: sooperkanoon.com/487937
Court: Allahabad High Court
Judge: S.P. Srivastava and D.R. Chaudhary, JJ.
Decided On: Dec 13, 2002
Case Number: C.M.W.P. No. 52923 of 2002
Subject: Property;Civil

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Property - maintainability of writ - Article 226 of Constitution of India and Sections 14 and 27 of U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 - petitioner erected building sanctioned by competent authority - permission granted withdrawn later on and competent authority passed demolition order - order challenged...

Key legal issue: Property;Civil
Acts & sections: Constitution of India - Article 226; Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 - Sections 14, 27, 27(1) and 27(2)

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Mahendra NaraIn Singh and anr.

Advocate V.K. Goel, Adv.

Respondent

Varanasi Development Authority and ors.

Advocate V.B. Singh, Adv. and ;Atul Mehra, S.C.

Legal References

Acts: Constitution of India - Article 226; Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 - Sections 14, 27, 27(1) and 27(2)
Reported In: 2003(1)AWC445; (2003)1UPLBEC406

Excerpt

.....victim held, the term income has different connotations for different purposes. a court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms. section 168 uses the word just compensation which, in our opinion, should be assigned a broad meaning. it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the private sector companies in place of introducing a pension scheme takes recourse to payment of contributory provident fund, gratuity and other perks to attract the people who are efficient and hard working. different offers made to an officer by the employer, same may be either for the benefit of the employee himself or for the benefit of the entire family if some facilities are being provided whereby the entire family stands to benefit, the same, must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis whereof the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants is required to be determined. the amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. from the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted......their grievances. 4. learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the impugned order is not appealable and the provisions contained in section 27 of u. p. urban planning and development act, 1973, cannot be taken to have been attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. 5. so far as this aspect is concerned, it may be noticed that the provision contained in section 27 (2) of the said act of 1973 provides that any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (1) may appeal to the chairman within thirty days from the date thereof and the chairman may after hearing the parties to the appeal either allow or dismiss the appeal or may reverse or vary any part of the order. apart from various orders which are contemplated under section27 (1) of the act, an order of the vice-chairman, where any development in a development area has been commenced or continued or has been completed in contravention of the master plan or zonal development plan or without the permission, approval or sanction referred to in section 14 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permission, approval or sanction has been granted, in relation to the development area, directing that such development shall be removed by demolition, is also included thereunder. 6. in the present case, the sanction granted earlier has been withdrawn with the result that the entire construction/development which is alleged to have been raised is rendered without any permission as the permission granted has ceased to be operative. in such a circumstance, the order of the vice-chairman of such a consequence is certainly open to appeal and the appellate authority has ample jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against such an order and dispose it of as provided under section 27 (2) of the act. 7. in the aforesaid view of the matter, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no appeal lies against the impugned order which directs the removal of the construction.....

Full Judgment

S.P. Srivastava and D.R. Chaudhary, JJ.

1. Heard Sri V.K. Goel for the petitioners and Sri V.B. Singh, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Atul Mehra for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4.

2. The petitioners feel aggrieved by an order passed by the Vice-chairman of the Varanasi Development Authority, Varanasi, dated 18.11.2002 communicated on 20.11.2002, whereby the Zonal Officer has been directed to initiate immediate action for demolition of the constructions in dispute, recalling the permission sanctioning the building plan which had been granted on 27.7.1995.

3. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that since the petitioners have an efficacious statutory alternative remedy of appeal available to them for the redressal of their grievances as envisaged under Section 27 of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, which remedy has not yet been availed of by them, they deserve to be relegated to the alternative remedy for the redressal of their grievances.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the impugned order is not appealable and the provisions contained in Section 27 of U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, cannot be taken to have been attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

5. So far as this aspect is concerned, it may be noticed that the provision contained in Section 27 (2) of the said Act of 1973 provides that any person aggrieved by an order under Sub-section (1) may appeal to the Chairman within thirty days from the date thereof and the Chairman may after hearing the parties to the appeal either allow or dismiss the appeal or may reverse or vary any part of the order. Apart from various orders which are contemplated under Section27 (1) of the Act, an order of the Vice-Chairman, where any development in a development area has been commenced or continued or has been completed in contravention of the master plan or zonal development plan or without the permission, approval or sanction referred to in Section 14 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permission, approval or sanction has been granted, in relation to the development area, directing that such development shall be removed by demolition, is also included thereunder.

6. In the present case, the sanction granted earlier has been withdrawn with the result that the entire construction/development which is alleged to have been raised is rendered without any permission as the permission granted has ceased to be operative. In such a circumstance, the order of the Vice-Chairman of such a consequence is certainly open to appeal and the appellate authority has ample jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against such an order and dispose it of as provided under Section 27 (2) of the Act.

7. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no appeal lies against the impugned order which directs the removal of the construction treating the same to have been raised without permission is totally misconceived.

8. The writ petition, in the circumstances, is disposed of finally providing that in case the petitioners file an appeal against the impugned order within two weeks from today as contemplated under Section 27 (2) of the aforesaid Act, the appellate authority shall consider the same on merits and dispose it of by a reasoned order preferably within a period of one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before such authority.

9. During the interregnum, the status quo as on today in respect of the building in dispute shall be maintained.

10. Ordered accordingly.

Same Court & Year Allahabad · 2002 Same Parties Mahendra NaraIn Singh and anr. vs Varanasi Development Author... Same Subject Property;Civil Same Judge S.P. Srivastava and D.R. Chaudhary, JJ. Acts & Sections Constitution of India - Article 226; Uttar Pradesh Urban Plan...

Property;Civil