Full Judgment
Tudball, J.
1. This is a plaintiff's appeal. The plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant, Jafar Beg, and others with whom we are not concerned in this appeal, to recover damages for malicious prosecution. His case was that a riot occurred and a report was made by certain complainants in the course of which they named one Bachcha Ahir. At the instigation of certain persons the defendant, who vas the Sub-Inspector, put the name of Bachcha Singh in place of Bachcha Ahir, proceeded to make an inquiry against him, arrested him, and sent him for trial in Court where he was finally acquitted. The present suit was decreed as against one of the other defendants. As against Jafar Beg it was dismissed by the Court of first instance, on the ground that under Section 42 of the Police Act the suit had not been instituted within three months of the unlawful act alleged. The pin in tiff appealed. The lower Appellate Court upheld the decree of the Court of first instance but for a different reason. Notice was given by the plaintiff to the defendant on the 7th of June 1912, the suit was instituted on the 7th of July 1912. Applying Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the lower Court held that the suit must fail as it was brought before the expiry of two months next after notice had been delivered to the defendant as set forth in the section.
2. The plaintiff has come here in second appeal. This urged that under Section 42 of the Police Act, it was necessary for the plaintiff to give only one month's notice and not two months' notice as laid down in Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. It seems to me that the fallacy in the argument lies in this, that Section 42 on the Police Act refers to 'all actions and prosecutions against any person which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Police Act itself or under the general Police powers thereby given.' The present suit for damages is brought against the Sub-Inspector for acts done by him in the exercise of the powers granted to him by the Criminal Procedure Code. What lie did was nothing done under the provisions of the Police Act or the general Police powers given under the Act. I have been referred to Sections 23 and 24 of the Police Act. Section 23 merely lays down that it is the duty of every Police Officer, among other things 'to apprehend, all persons whom he is legally authorized to apprehend, and for whose apprehension sufficient grounds exist.' This, no doubt, lays down what the Sub-Inspector's duty was but this does not give him any power to arrest. That power lie receives under Section 24 of the Police Act. Section 24 simply says that it shall be lawful for any Police Officer to lay any information before a Magistrate and to apply for a summons, warrant, search warrant, or such other legal process as may by law issue against any person committing an offence.' In the present case, the acts of which complaint is made were acts of arrest and prosecution in the Court of the Magistrate. Neither of these is an act which is contemplated by Section 24 of the Police Act. The special period of limitation which was given in Section 24 of the Police Act has been repealed by the subsequent Limitation Act, Act IX of 1871, Schedule I. That Act merely repealed so much as related to limitation of suits, but it did not alter the scope of Section 42 of the Act which clearly related to acts done under the provisions of that Act itself or the general Police powers given by that Act. It cannot and does not relate to suits or actions brought in regard to acts done in the exercise of the powers granted by other Acts to Police Officers. In my opinion the decision of the lower Court is correct. Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code applies and the suit was instituted before the expiry of two months mentioned therein. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.