Full Judgment
Grimwood Mears, C.J. and Pramada Charan Banerji, J.
1. This is an application by the appellants, who ask the Court to extend the time for furnishing security and making a deposit for translation and printing and other charges. The rule which prescribes the time within which an appellant should furnish security for the costs of the respondent and deposit the amount required to defray the expenses of translation and printing and other charges was, until Act No. XXVI of 1920, in these terms: 'Where a certificate is granted the applicant shall within six months from the date of the decree complained of, or within six weeks from the date of the grant of the certificate, whichever is the later date, furnish security etc.' By Section 3(1) of Act XXVI of 1920 the words 'six months' have been cut down and in their place the following words are to be read '90 days or such further period not exceeding 60 days as the Court may, upon cause shown, allow.' As the appellant in this case is appealing against a decree of the 2nd day of March, 1921, he having on the 30th day of July, 1921, obtained a certificate, he is admittedly on any reckoning outside and beyond both periods of 90 days from the date of the decree and six weeks from the date of the granting of the certificate. He is indeed also out of time as regards the longer possible period of 90 days plus 60 days. Therefore the dates we have given show that on the facts of this case the question before us is whether as the law now stands we have got power to extend the time beyond the periods which are mentioned in the amendment. It is conceded in argument that the object of the amendment of 1920 is to try to effect a speeding up in appeals which proceed from this country to the Privy Council, and we think that is a matter which must be borne in mind by us in construing this section as amended. Under the old section to be found in Order XLV, Rule 7, of the Coda of Civil Procedure of 1908 the courts had decided that the periods mentioned in Rule 1 were directory only, and that though they were normally the proper periods which should be observed by appellants, they could nevertheless be extended in the discretion of the Court if there were circumstances which the Court thought weighty enough to make it proper for the period to be extended. There is no doubt that it was the uniform practice to extend the time upon cause shown. The question before us is whether having regard to the very careful drafting of the amendment the discretion of the Court is not curtailed and limited, as regards the period from the date of the decree, to an extension of 60 days, beyond which under no circumstances the Court can go We are of opinion that that is the real meaning and the intended effect of the section. It will be seen that the period of six weeks from the grant of the certificate has not got coupled with it any discretionary period. In practice an appellant secures not much less than 150 days from the decree appealed against under this provision. Our view is that we have no power to extend the period beyond those times which are now definitely and clearly set out in the amended Order XLV, Rule 7. To decide otherwise and grant extension beyond the period of six weeks would in our view defeat the object and intention of the amendment. The application is therefore rejected and the certificate revoked.