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Mian Jan Vs. Man Singh

Mian Jan vs Man Singh

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Dec 31, 1969
~2 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/449679

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Citation
Court
Allahabad High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Civil

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Sale in execution - Act X of 1877 (Civil Procedure Code, Sections 311, 312--Review of judgment. - CANTONMENTS ACT[C.A. No. 41/2006]. Section 346 & Cantonment Fund (Servants Rules, 1937, Rules 13, 14 & 15: [H.L. Gokhale, Ag. CJ, P.V. Hardas, Naresh H. Patil, R.M. Borde & R.M. Savant, JJ] Jurisdiction of School Tribun...

Key legal issue
Civil

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Mian Jan

Respondent

Man Singh

Legal References

Reported In
(1880)ILR2All686

Excerpt

sale in execution - act x of 1877 (civil procedure code, sections 311, 312--review of judgment. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is.....pearson, j.1. the first plea in appeal is abandoned as untenable. the statement contained in the second ground of appeal is not accurate. what appears from the proceedings is that the 20th september 1878, had been fixed for the sale of the judgment-debtor's property in execution of decree in pursuance of an order of the subordinate judge, who, on that same date on the judgment-debtor's application, ordered the sale to be postponed. the sanction to the sale originally given being thus withdrawn, it follows that the sale could not legally be held, and that the sale which was effected, the order of postponment notwithstanding, was unlawful and invalid. it is true that the sale had been effected before the order directing its postponement had reached the officer conducting the sale, but the circumstance, though it exonerates him from blame in the matter, does not make the sale good and valid. it is to be regretted that the subordinate judge should have confirmed the sale which he now rightly pronounces to have been wholly illegal. it seems that he thought himself precluded from setting it aside suo motu, and no application had been made to him to set it aside. shortly after he had confirmed the sale an application was made to him by the decree-holder to review his order confirming it, whereupon he set aside the sale as illegal, and so virtually reversed his former order. in reviewing his order and setting aside the sale as illegal, we cannot say that he acted ultra vires or that his action was otherwise illegal. this application is therefore disallowed and dismissed with costs.

Full Judgment

Pearson, J.

1. The first plea in appeal is abandoned as untenable. The statement contained in the second ground of appeal is not accurate. What appears from the proceedings is that the 20th September 1878, had been fixed for the sale of the judgment-debtor's property in execution of decree in pursuance of an order of the Subordinate Judge, who, on that same date on the judgment-debtor's application, ordered the sale to be postponed. The sanction to the sale originally given being thus withdrawn, it follows that the sale could not legally be held, and that the sale which was effected, the order of postponment notwithstanding, was unlawful and invalid. It is true that the sale had been effected before the order directing its postponement had reached the officer conducting the sale, but the circumstance, though it exonerates him from blame in the matter, does not make the sale good and valid. It is to be regretted that the Subordinate Judge should have confirmed the sale which he now rightly pronounces to have been wholly illegal. It seems that he thought himself precluded from setting it aside suo motu, and no application had been made to him to set it aside. Shortly after he had confirmed the sale an application was made to him by the decree-holder to review his order confirming it, whereupon he set aside the sale as illegal, and so virtually reversed his former order. In reviewing his order and setting aside the sale as illegal, we cannot say that he acted ultra vires or that his action was otherwise illegal. This application is therefore disallowed and dismissed with costs.

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