Emperor Vs. Umer-ud-din

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....aikman, j.1. in my opinion no sufficient ground exists for interfering in this case. mohammad farookh, a soldier serving with his regiment in burma, sent an intimation to the district magistrate of bijnor that he had authorised his brother to bring a complaint against the applicant, umer-ud-din, for enticing away his (mohammad farookh's) wife. this charge against the accused was heard by a magistrate. when evidence for both sides had been recorded, it struck the magistrate that the husband's brother held no authority to institute the case and he ended his judgment with the words 'i therefore acquit the accused.' thereupon the husband, having obtained leave, came from burma and instituted a fresh complaint. in answer to this the applicant set up the previous acquittal. in my opinion the so-called acquittal is, under the circumstances, no bar to the trial of the present charge. the magistrate's previous finding amounted to this that there was no complaint before him of which he could take cognizance. if it were necessary i should have no hesitation in setting aside the previous so-called acquittal and directing the present trial to proceed. vide queen empress v. balwant (1886) i.l.r. 9 all. 135. but i do not think this is necessary and content myself with dismissing the application.