Chhallu Vs. Emperor

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........on the other. girwar deceased came and intervened. the prosecution evidence shows that the appellant had a spear in his hand with which girwar was stabbed, and he died after some time. it has been found by the learned sessions judge-and i think rightly -that the appellant did not intend to strike girwar and it was by accident that he was struck while he was intervening in separating the persons who were fighting with one another. the learned sessions judge has convicted the appellant under section 304a, i.p.c. section 304a must be read along with sections 336, 337 and 338, i.p.c. all the sections are confined in their operation to acts done without any criminal intent, apart from the rashness or negligence which is their essential ingredient. in this case there can be no doubt that the appellant was using his spear against his assailants. where a man strikes at another with a spear, he is committing a criminal offence independently altogether of any element of rashness which may be involved in his striking by chance another person who might come to intervene. beading section 321, i.p.c., with section 322, i.p.c., it is obvious that the guilt of an accused person remains just the same whether in seeking to inflict simple hurt or grievous hurt, as the case may be, upon one person he actually causes the intended hurt to that person or to some other. the appellant must therefore be held guilty under the provisions of section 326, i.p.c. his conviction under section 304a is illegal. i therefore set aside his conviction under section 304a, i.p.c., and in lieu thereof convict him under section 326, i.p.c. the sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment in a case like this cannot be regarded as severe. it is therefore maintained.