Dina Nath Vs. Emperor

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........appears that the applicant had applied to the civil authorities for an identity card and was availing himself of its benefits. he was, thereafter, employed in the central ordnance depot and secured ration from the military authorities also.2. the facts are not in dispute before me. the question of sentence has, however, been pressed the courts below proceeded upon clause (6) of the rules as it stood before the amendment. i have no doubt in my mind that the clause as it stood prior to the amendment cannot hurt the applicant. all that the clause forbids is the applicationfor an identity card when provision has been made for the supply to him of government food-grains in any other identity card or in any other way.his subsequent employment in the central ordnance depot will not, therefore, bring him within its mischief. but the clause has been subsequently amended and what has-been forbidden is not merely the application for the card, but its use when provision has been made for the man '...in any other way.'3. i would not have reduced the sentence because a sentence of six weeks is by no means an unduly severe sentence for a case of this character. but i have been impressed by the argument that, although it is true that ignorantia legis neminem exousat is a well known principle, nevertheless there are cases in which the rigour of that maxim may be mitigated. there can be no doubt that rules and orders have of late - of course, for very good reasons, because nothing can be more important than the safety of the realm - been enacted in quick succession and it is not surprising if the applicant was unaware of this amendment. let alone the applicant who is by no means a highly educated, if not an illiterate, man, even the courts below were unaware of this amendment. it might, therefore, well be that the breach of the rule was committed in sheer ignorance. i, therefore, think that the merits of the case do demand a reduction of the sentence. the man has already, i am.....