Skip to content
How to use Judgment tools
  1. Click Tools to open PDF, Print, Tag, Note, Favourite, and CiteSignal.
  2. Use Brief & Ask in the toolbar for the AI Brief and case chat.
  3. Jump to sections with the pills below the help bar.

Nand Kishore Vs. Abdur Rahman

Nand Kishore vs Abdur Rahman

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Jul 31, 1919
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/449379

For advocates & juniors · 7-day free trial

Brief this judgment before chambers

Stop skimming 50 pages - get an 18-section AI Brief on this case, ask scoped follow-ups, and find related precedents with Semantic Search. Full trial, no card required.

  • 18-section brief - facts, issues, ratio, relief
  • Ask this case - answers cite the judgment
  • Semantic search - find precedents by meaning
  • Research drawer - sections, cites, related cases

No card required · credentials emailed · Log in if you already have an account

Citation
Court
Allahabad
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Civil

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Civil Procedure Code (1908), Section 104; Order XLIII, Rule 1(a) - Order returning a plaint for presentation in the proper court--Appeal. - CANTONMENTS ACT[C.A. No. 41/2006]. Section 346 & Cantonment Fund (Servants Rules, 1937, Rules 13, 14 & 15: [H.L. Gokhale, Ag. CJ, P.V. Hardas, Naresh H. Patil, R.M. Borde & R.M....

Key legal issue
Civil

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Nand Kishore

Respondent

Abdur Rahman

Legal References

Reported In
AIR1919All82(2); (1920)ILR42All74

Excerpt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........all. 174, that an appeal lay from the order of an appellate court directing a plaint to be returned. subsequently, in the case of dalip singh v. kundan singh (1913) i.l.r. 36 all. 58, a bench of this court has held that the present code of civil procedure makes no change in the law in this respect. we are, therefore, content to follow these authorities. assuming that the appeal lies, it raises only one question, namely, whether the lower appellate court has not overlooked the provisions of section 21 of the code of civil procedure. the case before us is in fact very similar in principle to that of dalip singh v. kundan singh (1913) i.l.r. 36 all. 58, above referred to, except that in that case reference was made to the provisions of clause 2 of section 11 of the suits valuation act (no. vii of 1877), whereas in the present case the question was one of territorial jurisdiction and reference is made to the closing part of section 21 of the code of civil procedure. we think the appeal must succeed on this ground. the lower appellate court, before allowing the objection as to the place of suing, should have considered whether there had been a failure of justice consequent on the suit having been instituted in the court of the city munsif of moradabad instead of in the court of the munsif of sambhal in the same district. this point has been altogether overlooked, and we must, therefore, follow the precedent set in the case above referred to by setting aside the order under appeal and sending back the case to the lower appellate court to be re-admitted under its original number in the file of pending appeals and disposed of on the merits. we order accordingly.

Full Judgment

Pramada Charan Banerji and Piggot, JJ.

1. This is an appeal from an order passed by the Subordinate Judge of Moradabad in an appeal directing the plaint filed in the case to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation in the proper court. The suit was brought in the court of the City Munsif of Moradabad. One of the pleas taken in defence was that the suit was not cognizable by that court, but should have been brought in the court of the Munsif of Sambhal. The learned City Munsif set down the suit for hearing, framed proper issues, held that the cause of action had arisen within his jurisdiction and gave the plaintiff a decree. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge held, that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the court of the Munsif of Moradabad City. Without going further into the matter, he passed the order now under appeal. That order no doubt could' be passed under the powers of an appellate court as specified in Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is also covered by the provisions of Order XLI, rule 33, of the same Code. It is, nevertheless, an order returning a plaint to be presented to the proper court such as is referred to in order VII, Rule 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure. An objection has been taken in this Court, to the effect that no appeal lies. On the wording of Order XLIII, Rule 1 (a), we were disposed in any case to over-rule this objection, but we find that the point is covered by clear authority. It was decided under the former Code of Civil Procedure in Wahid-ullah v. Kanhaya Lal (1902) I.L.R. 25 All. 174, that an appeal lay from the order of an appellate court directing a plaint to be returned. Subsequently, in the case of Dalip Singh v. Kundan Singh (1913) I.L.R. 36 All. 58, a Bench of this Court has held that the present Code of Civil Procedure makes no change in the law in this respect. We are, therefore, content to follow these authorities. Assuming that the appeal lies, it raises only one question, namely, whether the lower appellate court has not overlooked the provisions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case before us is in fact very similar in principle to that of Dalip Singh v. Kundan Singh (1913) I.L.R. 36 All. 58, above referred to, except that in that case reference was made to the provisions of Clause 2 of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act (No. VII of 1877), whereas in the present case the question was one of territorial jurisdiction and reference is made to the closing part of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We think the appeal must succeed on this ground. The lower appellate court, before allowing the objection as to the place of suing, should have considered whether there had been a failure of justice consequent on the suit having been instituted in the court of the City Munsif of Moradabad instead of in the court of the Munsif of Sambhal in the same district. This point has been altogether overlooked, and we must, therefore, follow the precedent set in the case above referred to by setting aside the order under appeal and sending back the case to the lower appellate court to be re-admitted under its original number in the file of pending appeals and disposed of on the merits. We order accordingly.

Continue Your Research


AI Briefs · Semantic Search · Save & annotate judgments

Start your 7-day free trial