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Queen-empress Vs. Puran and ors.

Queen-empress vs Puran and ors.

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Dec 31, 1969
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/449355

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Citation
Court
Allahabad High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Complaint, dismissal of - Revival of proceedings--Criminal Procedure Code, Sections 203, 437. - CANTONMENTS ACT[C.A. No. 41/2006]. Section 346 & Cantonment Fund (Servants Rules, 1937, Rules 13, 14 & 15: [H.L. Gokhale, Ag. CJ, P.V. Hardas, Naresh H. Patil, R.M. Borde & R.M. Savant, JJ] Jurisdiction of School Tribunal...

Key legal issue
Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Queen-empress

Respondent

Puran and ors.

Legal References

Reported In
(1887)ILR9All85

Excerpt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........objection to the magistrate who passed the order of discharge re-opening the case.' the note is represented to be based on three rulings of high court3 in india.3. the magistrate of the district has not made any allusion to the note and rulings relied upon by his subordinate, but has referred to a note under section 203 of the same edition, and to a madras high court ruling of the 28th march 1878. the note is to the effect that a complaint dismissed under section 203, criminal procedure code, 'cannot be re-heard except on an order made under section 437.' all of the four judgments above referred to under either section 203 or section 437 were apparently delivered before the present criminal procedure code came into force. neither of the madras rulings is obtainable here, and in all probability neither of the lower courts has had an opportunity of perusing either of them. neither of the two judgments appear to be precisely in point. in the present case the complainant was not, on the first occasion, asked if he had any witnesses to call, and beyond his own brief statement no evidence whatever was recorded.4. i think that when the magistrate who had dismissed the original complaint ordered a further inquiry, on receiving the complainant's second petition, he did not act contrary to any provision of the law ; and considering the circumstances under which the complaint had been dismissed, a further inquiry was, in my opinion, necessary.5. i see no reason for interference. the applicants will work out the unexpired portions of their short sentences, and the record will be returned to the district court.

Full Judgment

Brodhurst, J.

1. This case has been referred merely because the Officiating Magistrate of the District is of opinion that the Magistrate of the first class, who originally received the complaint, and who dismissed it under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code, was not empowered to re-open the case on the mere application of the complainant, and without a further inquiry having been directed by the District Magistrate, the Court of Session, or the High Court, under Section 437 of the Code. The first complaint was made on the 25th May 1886. In his petition the complainant stated that the accused had given him a severe beating, had then falsely charged him with theft, and had taken him to the police-station. He added that the thanadar had made an inquiry, bad obtained no proof to support the charge of theft, and had therefore released him. His evidence was very briefly recorded by the Magistrate on the 28th May. He deposed to the same effect as stated in his petition, and he referred to lathi marks as the result of the assault that had been committed upon him. The Magistrate ordered that a 'copy of the petition be sent to the police-station, calling for a report on the matter.' The Magistrate apparently passed this order because the complainant alleged that the thanadar had already made the inquiry above referred to. There is nothing in the order to show that the Magistrate saw 'reason to distrust the truth of the complaint.' He did not record any 'reasons for distrusting the truth of the complaint,' nor did he 'direct a local investigation to be made by a police officer for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint.' The Magistrate did not comply with the provisions of Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and he ought not, merely on the report he received, to have dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Code.

2. Sardar Lachman Singh, Magistrate of the first class, referred to a note under Section 437 in Mr. Prinsep's edition of the Criminal Procedure Code as supporting his view. The note is as follows: 'If, however, fresh evidence be forthcoming there would apparently be no objection to the Magistrate who passed the order of discharge re-opening the case.' The note is represented to be based on three rulings of High Court3 in India.

3. The Magistrate of the District has not made any allusion to the note and rulings relied upon by his subordinate, but has referred to a note under Section 203 of the same edition, and to a Madras High Court ruling of the 28th March 1878. The note is to the effect that a complaint dismissed under Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, 'cannot be re-heard except on an order made under Section 437.' All of the four judgments above referred to under either Section 203 or Section 437 were apparently delivered before the present Criminal Procedure Code came into force. Neither of the Madras rulings is obtainable here, and in all probability neither of the lower Courts has had an opportunity of perusing either of them. Neither of the two judgments appear to be precisely in point. In the present case the complainant was not, on the first occasion, asked if he had any witnesses to call, and beyond his own brief statement no evidence whatever was recorded.

4. I think that when the Magistrate who had dismissed the original complaint ordered a further inquiry, on receiving the complainant's second petition, he did not act contrary to any provision of the law ; and considering the circumstances under which the complaint had been dismissed, a further inquiry was, in my opinion, necessary.

5. I see no reason for interference. The applicants will work out the unexpired portions of their short sentences, and the record will be returned to the District Court.

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