Tilak Ram Vs. Dalip Singh

Tilak Ram vs Dalip Singh

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Jan 25, 1918

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/449047
Court: Allahabad
Judge: Henry Richards, C.J. and ;Pramada Charan Banerji, JJ.
Decided On: Jan 25, 1918
Subject: Criminal

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Criminal Procedure Code, Section 195 - Sanction to prosecute--Period for which sanction remains in force--Terminus a quo. - CANTONMENTS ACT[C.A. No. 41/2006]. Section 346 & Cantonment Fund (Servants Rules, 1937, Rules 13, 14 & 15: [H.L. Gokhale, Ag. CJ, P.V. Hardas, Naresh H. Patil, R.M. Borde & R.M. Savant, JJ] Jur...

Key legal issue: Criminal

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Tilak Ram

Respondent

Dalip Singh

Legal References

Reported In: AIR1918All243; (1918)ILR40All338

Excerpt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........filed, but the sessions judge held that the sanction was still in force. whereupon the opposite party applied in revision to this court. a learned judge considering the matter of some importance has referred the question to a bench of two judges.2. section 195 of the code of criminal procedure provides that no court shall take cognizance of certain offences committed under certain circumstances without the previous sanction therein referred to. clause (6) is as follows:---'any sanction given or, refused under this section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate, and no sanction shall remain in force for more than six months from the date on which it was given, provided that the high court may, for good cause shown, extend the time' in the present case the high court has never been asked for, nor has it granted, any extension of time. the question which we have to decide is whether under the circumstances of the present case it can be said that the sanction was still in force. if we hold that the sanction was 'given' on the 1st of november, 1915, it is clearly long since out of date. on the other band, if we hold that the sanction was 'given' after the case had gone back to the additional district judge and he had refused the application to revoke the sanction granted by the assistant collector then the prosecution was begun within time. we think it is impossible to hold on the clear meaning of the words of clause (6) of section 195 that the sanction can possibly be said to have been 'given' by the additional district judge. the application before him simply was an application to revoke sanction which had been previously granted, and his order was to refuse to revoke that sanction. it may be said that an opposite party by taking proceedings can always use up the whole six months in applications to the court and thus make the sanction of no avail. there are two answers to this. in the first place, if a.....

Full Judgment

Henry Richards, C.J. and Pramada Charan Banerji, J.

1. In this case it appears that sanction was granted to a litigant in the Revenue Court to prosecute the opposite party for alleged offences under Section 471 and other sections of the Indian Penal Code. The sanction was granted on the 1st of November, 1915, by an Assistant Collector. On the 11th of May, 1916, this sanction was set aside on the technical ground that the Assistant Collector who had granted sanction had no jurisdiction to do so. The High Court held that the Additional District Judge was wrong and sent the case back, with the result that the Additional District Judge held, that, a prima facie case had been made out why the opposite party should be prosecuted, and he accordingly refused the application to revoke the sanction given by the Assistant Collector. A considerable time had elapsed in the meantime, and in July, 1917, a criminal complaint was lodged. This was met with the objection that the sanction was out of date and that therefore the court could not take cognizance of the offence. This objection found favour with the court before whom the complaint was filed, but the Sessions Judge held that the sanction was still in force. Whereupon the opposite party applied in revision to this Court. A learned Judge considering the matter of some importance has referred the question to a Bench of two Judges.

2. Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no court shall take cognizance of certain offences committed under certain circumstances without the previous sanction therein referred to. Clause (6) is as follows:---'Any sanction given or, refused under this section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate, and no sanction shall remain in force for more than six months from the date on which it was given, provided that the High Court may, for good cause shown, extend the time' In the present case the High Court has never been asked for, nor has it granted, any extension of time. The question which we have to decide is whether under the circumstances of the present case it can be said that the sanction was still in force. If we hold that the sanction was 'given' on the 1st of November, 1915, it is clearly long since out of date. On the other band, if we hold that the sanction was 'given' after the case had gone back to the Additional District Judge and he had refused the application to revoke the sanction granted by the Assistant Collector then the prosecution was begun within time. We think it is impossible to hold on the clear meaning of the words of Clause (6) of Section 195 that the sanction can possibly be said to have been 'given' by the Additional District Judge. The application before him simply was an application to revoke sanction which had been previously granted, and his order was to refuse to revoke that sanction. It may be said that an opposite party by taking proceedings can always use up the whole six months in applications to the court and thus make the sanction of no avail. There are two answers to this. In the first place, if a party to whom sanction has been given chooses to take advantage of that sanction and lodges his complaint then he will be able to continue the prosecution notwithstanding any applications that the other side may make. It is possible that the court might stay the prosecution pending the decision of an application to revoke the sanction, but the prosecution would nevertheless have been begun within time. In the second place, there is an express power given to the High Court to extend the time for good cause shown Our attention has been called to two cases of the Madras High Court. In In re Muthukudam Pillai (1902) I. L. R., 26 Mad., 190. a Bench of two Judges expressly held that the sanction in a case like the present is 'given' by the court who first granted it and not by the court who subsequently refused to revoke the sanction. A different view was taken by a Bench of the same High Court in Muthuswami Mudali v. Veeni Chetti (1907) I. L. R., 20 Mad., 382., and in a more recent ease, The Public Prosecutor v. Raver Unithiri; Marvathar Vittil v. Ambumarar : AIR1914 Mad50 . We prefer to follow the earlier ruling of two Judges. The result is that we allow the application, set aside the order of the Sessions Judge and restore that of the court of first instance.

Same Parties Tilak Ram vs Dalip Singh Same Subject Criminal Same Judge Henry Richards, C.J. and ;Pramada Charan Banerji, JJ.

Criminal