Hamid HusaIn Vs. Kubra Begam

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....piggott and walsh, jj.1. this was a suit by a muhammadan husband for restitution of conjugal rights in which, by our order of the 8th of august last, we thought it necessary to remit certain issues for more specific findings by the lower appellate court. those findings have now been returned, and we are-satisfied that they cannot be successfully assailed on the grounds taken in the petition of objections filed by the plaintiff appellant. we desire to refer to the case of armour v. armour (1914) 1 a. l. j., 318. as laying down sound principles of law which we accept and propose to apply to the facts found in this case by the learned district judge. we think the findings of the learned district judge proceed upon evidence and are not vitiate by any erroneous view of the law. we must ace apt his finding that the defendant has reasonable grounds for believing that her health and safety would be endangered if she returned to her husband's custody, and in our opinion this finding disposes of the appeal. we dismiss the appeal accordingly with costs.