.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....pramada charan banerji and ryves, jj.1. mrs. williams lodged a complaint against w. c. keymer, charging him with several offences in connection with the purchase of a phaeton and a motor car. the case was tried at length by a magistrate of the first class, who, on the 17th of march, 1913, passed an order of discharge on all the (1) weekly notes, 1895, p. 86. charges. subsequently mrs. williams complained to the police with reference to an item of rs. 182, which she had paid to keymer in connection with the purchase of a motor car and which she charged him with criminally misappropriating. the case was re-instated in the court of the same magistrate who had already passed the order of discharge as stated above. in this second case he has taken some evidence on behalf of the prosecution and framed a charge. this court was then moved in revision on the ground that it was not open to the magistrate having once discharged the accused, to again inquire into the same charge on a second complaint. it seems to us that we are bound by the ruling in queen-empress v. umedan (1). that ruling completely covers the facts of this case, and it has been followed more than once in this court. that, no doubt, was a case of the dismissal of a complaint under section 203 of the code of criminal procedure, but in our opinion the principle is the same and applies to this present case. we think, therefore, that the magistrate had jurisdiction. we think, however, that the more appropriate tribunal to decide this case is a civil court. the application is rejected. with these observations we direct the record to be returned for disposal.