Basdeo Pande Vs. Balbhaddar Pande

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........police of what had occurred, and the police acting upon that information held an inquiry which resulted in a criminal prosecution, if under such circumstances the informant should be held liable to be sued in a civil court for damages for false imprisonment. we think that the decision of a bench of the madras high court in the case of narasinga row v. muthaya pillai (1902) i.l.r., 26 mad., 362 is correct. the facts of that case were very similar to the facts of the case before us. in that case the principal defendant gave information to the police that the plaintiff had illegally broken open the outer door of his house with intent to attach his property for arrears of kist. the station-house officer then held an investigation and subsequently charged the plaintiff before a magistrate. the magistrate tried the case and dismissed it, and thereupon the plaintiff sued for damages for malicious prosecution. ill was held by boddam and bhashyam ayyangar, jj., that 'the only person who can be sued in an action for malicious prosecution is the person who prosecutes in this case, though the first defendant may have instituted criminal proceedings before the police, he certainly did not prosecute the plaintiff. he merely gave information to the police, and the police, after investigation, appear to have thought fit to prosecute the plaintiff. the first defendant is not responsible for their acts.' we agree in this statement of the law. the present claim is for damages for false imprisonment. if a party is not liable for damages for malicious prosecution, under the circumstances indicated above, it is difficult to see how he could be held liable for damages for false imprisonment. we allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of both the lower courts, and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff with costs in all courts.