Queen-empress Vs. Ishri

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........in rs. 100 with two sureties in rs. 50 each to keep the peace for one year, or, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. it has been rightly held by the high court of calcutta in in re aslu v. the queen-empress i.l.r. 16 cal. 779, and by, this court in queen-empress v. lachman weekly notes 1890, p. 20, that the magistrate of a district when acting as an appellate court in criminal cases cannot make an order under section 106 of the code of criminal procedure. consequently the orders in respect to recognizances are bad, and, so far as the recognizances are concerned, they are quashed. the bonds, if given, are to be returned.2. it appears to us that the magistrate of the district exceeded his jurisdiction under section 423 of the code of criminal procedure in respect of the sentences under section 225b, of the indian penal code in this way. he maintained the sentence of three months' rigorous imprisonment under that section, and added to it a fine of ten rupees, or in default six weeks' rigorous imprisonment. that was dearly an enhancement of the sentence. the magistrate also, in our opinion, enhanced the sentences passed under section 342 of the indian penal code. it is true that he reduced the sentence of four months' rigorous imprisonment to one of three months' rigorous imprisonment, but he added to the sentence a sentence of a fine of ten rupees, or in default six weeks' rigorous imprisonment. the result might be that, if the ten rupees were not paid, each of these men would have to undergo practically four months and two weeks' rigorous imprisonment instead of four months' rigorous imprisonment for the offence under section 342. we set aside so much of the orders of the district magistrate as related to the fines, and the fines, if paid, must be returned at once.