Badri NaraIn and ors. Vs. Ram Das

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........received notice of removal he refused to vacate, to give up the papers relating to the property and to render accounts. the court of first instance, holding that the plaintiffs could not sue until they had first obtained the consent in writing of the officer authorized under section 539 of the code of civil procedure, dismissed the suit. the lower appellate court on appeal reversed the decree of the court of first instance and remanded the case under section 562 of the code. from that order of remand the present appeal has been filed, and it is contended that the decision of the court of first instance was right and that the suit was not maintainable without the consent referred to above. we have heard the learned vakil who appears in support of the appeal. in our opinion the view taken by the court below was the right view. as pointed out by woodroffe, j., in rai budree das mukim bahadur v. chuni lal johurry (1906) 10 c.w.n., 581, section 539 'does not take away or affect existing substantive rights unless it says so. secondly the section does not say so. to support the contrary contention it would have to be read as if the words 'but no other person or persons were inserted between the words 'advocate general' and 'may institute,' that is, that no person but the advocate general, or a public officer, or two or more persons with their consent can sue in the case of an alleged breach of trust or where directions for administration are necessary for the relief mentioned in the section.' in this case the suit has been instituted by the whole body of. persons authorized by the will to take action. it is not a suit merely by two or more persons having interest in the trust. the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. appeal dismissed.