Full Judgment
Allsop, J.
1. This is an application in revision by five men who had been sentenced to three fines each under three sections of the Penal Code, the aggregate in each case amounting to Rs. 40. They appealed to the learned Sessions Judge who held that no appeal lay because there was a sentence of fine only of an amount less than Rs. 50. Learned Counsel argues before me that three different sentences of fine in each case amounted to a sentence under Section 415, Criminal P. C., by which two or more punishments were combined and that an appeal consequently lay. He relies upon Makrand Singh v. Ganga . The Chief Court at Oudh is the only Court apparently which takes the view that two sentences of fine passed under different sections amount to a combined sentence which gives rise to a right of appeal. The contrary view has been taken in Ali Haji v. Joinab Bibi : AIR1932 Cal551 , in In re Venkataramayya : AIR1940 Mad111 and in Provincial Government v. Bhivram Nanhya . The argument of the learned Judges of Oudh Chief Court was based on the wording of Sections 413, 414 and 415, Criminal P. C., which are as follows:
Section 413. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, there shall be no appeal by a convicted person in cases in which a Court of Session passes a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one month only or in which a Court of Session or District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class passes a sentence of fine not exceeding fifty rupees only....
Section 414. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, there shall be no appeal by a convicted person in any case tried summarily in which a Magistrate empowered to act under Section 260 passes a sentence of fine not exceeding two hundred rupees only.
Section 415. An appeal may be brought against any sentence referred to in Section 413 or Section 414 by which any two or more of the punishments therein mentioned are combined, but no sentence which would not otherwise be liable to appeal shall be appealable merely on the ground that the person convicted is ordered to find security to keep the peace.
2. The argument is that Section 415 refers to two or more punishments as mentioned in Section 413 and Section 414 and as there is only one form of punishment mentioned in Section 414, that is, the sentence of fine, Section 415 must apply to two separate sentences of fine. The same argument might have been used in respect of Section 413 which refers to only two kinds of punishments. It seems to me that the explanation is that given by the learned Judges of the Madras and Nagpur Courts in the cases which I have mentioned. At one time there were sentences of imprisonment, fine and whipping mentioned in both Sections 413 and 414. When the sections were amended, the necessity of amending Section 415 was apparently overlooked. In my judgment, the contention of the applicants cannot be supported. They were sentenced to three different fines for three different offences under three different sections of the Penal Code. If each of those sentences is to be treated as a separate sentence, none of them comes within the provisions of Section 415 because in none of them are there any combined punishments. If, on the other hand, for the purposes of appeal the three sentences are to be considered as one combined sentence, then the sentence of fine is one cumulative sentence of fine of Rs. 40 and there is no question of any combination of sentences. In my opinion no appeal lies in a ease of this kind unless the cumulative fine amounts to more than Rs. 50.
3. The applicants have further complained that cross-examination by them of the chief witness for the opposite party was stopped by the learned Magistrate after 15 or 20 minutes. It is argued that this led to a failure of justice, but it has not been shown what necessary questions which should have been allowed were shut out by the Magistrate's action. It does not necessarily follow that a Magistrate or a Judge is being unfair if he puts a stop to cross-examination. It may be that learned Counsel in the Magistrate's Court was wasting unnecessary time and it was right for the Magistrate to prevent him from doing so. In my judgment there is no reason why I should interfere in this very petty case. The application is rejected.