Emperor Vs. Latoor

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........january 1929, he was found concealing and harbouring one baldewa an absconded 'offender' under sections 396 and 366, i.p.c. knowing or having reason to believe that the said person was an offender and absconder. we have been taken through the evidence on the record and we do not find that there are any sufficient materials on the record to show that baldewa had committed an offence under section 396 or section 366, i.p.c. we have been referred to the statement of mt. bharto who says that she was kidnapped by baldewa. baldewa has not yet been tried and the solitary statement of mt. bharto as to her being kidnapped by baldewa does not commend itself to us.5. the prosecution is confronted with another difficulty. there is neither affirmative nor any circumstantial evidence to bring home to the door of latoor that he knew or had reason to believe that baldewa was an offender within the meaning of section 212, i.p. c a person can be supposed to 'know' where there is a direct appeal to his senses. a person 'has reason to believe' under section 26, i.p.c. if he has sufficient cause to believe the thing but not other wise.6. it may be that proclamations were is sued broadcast against baldewa. it is possible that his property may have beer attached but it does not follow therefrom that baldewa was an offender. the word 'offender' used under section 212 i.p.c. means a person who has contravened the provision of any criminal law, which is punishable either with death transportation, imprisonment on fine. upon the evidence on the record it is impossible for us to come to the conclusion that baldewa was an offender' under section 212, i.p.c.7. the result is that we reject the reference. we set aside the order of the magistrate, convicting latoor under section 212, i.p.c. and direct that the fine if paid should be refunded to him.