.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978
[act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....banerji and aikman, jj.1. after examining the record and perusing the referring order of the learned sessions judge, we find no ground for quashing the commitment. the learned sessions judge has overlooked the fact that the ruling of this court in queen-empress v. sudra (1891) i.l.r., 14 all., 336, on which he relies, was expressly dissented from in the case of queen-empress v. brij narain man (1898) i.l.r., 20 all., 529. in the particular case under consideration, budhan was an accused person from the very first. all the evidence for the prosecution was taken in his presence and he had an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses. when that evidence had been recorded, the magistrate, for the reasons set forth in his order of the 10th of april 1906, deemed it necessary to offer a pardon to, budhan on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his know-ledge relative to the offence under inquiry. budhan accept ed that pardon, but immediately afterwards refused to make a statement, saying that he knew nothing. the magistrate accordingly revoked the pardon and proceeded with the inquiry; with the result that the accused, including budhan, were committed to the court of session. in our opinion there was no illegality in the magistrate's procedure. the learned judge will go on with the trial.