Full Judgment
Richards and Griffin, JJ.
1. This application is connected with Criminal Revisions Nos. 220 and 221 of 1908.
2. The facts are shortly a follows:
Certain civil proceedings were proceeding in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The suit was one by a Muhammadan lady for dower. In the course of the execution of a decree in that suit a compromise was filed on behalf of the lady by her vakil. The lady sent a complaint to the High Court, District Judge and the Subordinate Judge, alleging that the compromise had been filed contrary to her interest by her vakil in collusion with the other side. The Subordinate Judge apparently did not consider it necessary to take any steps as the result of the lady's communication. Her letter was unverified, and apparently not produced by a person duly authorized to produce it. The High Court sent the communication it received to the District Judge. The District Judge had the communication verified and sent it on to the Subordinate Judge for inquiry. It is quite possible that the District Judge did not intend that the Subordinate Judge should go the length of holding an inquiry under the Legal Practitioners Act as the result of his direction. The Subordinate Judge, however, did hold an inquiry under the Legal Practitioners Act. In the course of this inquiry the applicant was examined at a witness, and he is alleged to have stated, amongst other things, that he never instructed the pleader to file the compromise. The Subordinate Judge on the application of the pleader granted leave to prosecute Mazhar Hasan the present applicant. There was an appeal to the District Judge, who refused to interfere with the order of the Subordinate Judge. The present applications are made to this Court. Criminal Revision No. 220 is brought under Section 195 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure. In our judgment an application under Section 195 does not lie to this Court under the circumstances of the present case. The Subordinate Judge sanctioned the prosecution and the District Judge merely confirmed the order of the Subordinate Judge. The case is in our opinion governed by the case of Salig Ram v. Ramji Lal (1906) I.L.R. 24 All. 554. As to Criminal Revision No. 221 it is brought under the provisions of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is quite clear under the authority of the last mentioned case that this Court cannot entertain the application under the provisions of Section 439. This application is made under the provisions of Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and accordingly it is necessary for the applicant to show that the orders of the Subordinate Judge and of the District Judge were made without, jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the applicant contends that before an inquiry could be held under the Legal Practitioners Act, it was necessary that a pleader should 'be charged in his Court' with some offence mentioned in Section 14 of the Act, and he contends that the only charge in the Subordinate Judge's Court was the letter of the lady to him, and that the Subordinate Judge himself 'shelved,' that is to say, refused to hold any inquiry on that charge. We cannot agree with this contention. The Subordinate Judge lad before him first the lady's complaint. Subsequently he got from the District Judge a repetition of that complaint duly vended, and he then proceeded to hold the inquiry. We do not think that the shelving of the first letter was a refusal to entertain the charge, and we think that the first letter followed by the communication from the District Judge amounted to a 'charging of the pleader in the Court of the Subordinate Judge' within the meaning of Section 14. If then the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to hold the inquiry, it is quite clear that he had jurisdiction to grant the sanction, and the learned District Judge had jurisdiction to confirm the order of the Subordinate Judge. The application then is not brought within the provisions of Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and this Court has no power to interfere with it. As a result the application must be dismissed with costs.