Mohd. Habib and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....ravi s. dhavan, j.1. the issue raised in this writ petition is best summed up in the grounds to the writ petition. the petitioners, messra mohd. habib, mohd, ismail and nijamuddin, from mathura, all three of them are butchers. they say so in their petition and, add that they belong to the qureshi community and from their ancestors they have taken to the family profession to slaughter buffaloes and sell the meat within and beyond mathura.2. they contend that the state and its local administration are putting impediments in their trade and vocation and attempting to regulate it, by curtailing the number of buffaloes to be slaughtered, realising rs. 5 for each animal put to slaughter and restricting the export of the slaughtered animals outside mathura.3. the petitioners contend that their vocation and profession is their fundamental right, that is to say, to slaughter buffaloes and make a business from the meat which they sell.4. the court has considered this matter very carefully and heard the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners on the writ petition.5. the court is of the view that the constitution of india does not permit any citizen to claim that it is his fundamental right to take life and kill animals. a butcher may have his profession but he cannot claim it as a fundamental right by the constitution. otherwise, it will be a negation of the tenants of our constitution. the constitution of india has a chapter on fundamental duties. this is chapter iv-a- article 51a(g) ordains 'compassion for living creatures'.6. thus, the court is unable to persuade itself that butchery as a profession can be claimed as a fundamental right of a citizen. that a butcher may slaughter and make a business of it is one aspect of the matter, but, the state can regulate this business.7. the writ petition is devoid of merit and dismissed.