Mrs. L. Hilt Vs. V. Hilt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........by her father. but she says that she is undergoing a course of commercial training in the girls' high school at allahabad, which will ordinarily continue until the end of the year, and she prays that in the exercise of its discretion under section 44 of the act this court may direct the applicant to continue paying her maintenance upto 31st december of this year ; otherwise she will be unable to finish her course of training. her learned counsel contends that this court has a wide discretion; and in support of this contention he has referred to thomasset v. thomasset (1894) l.r. 1894 p. 295. that decision is authority for holding that in england a court can direct the payment of maintenance to a minor boy who is over 16 years of age and to a minor girl who is over 14 years of age when they have not reached the age of 21. but in section 3(5), indian divorce act, the expression 'minor children'--which occurs in section 44--is defined as sons of indian fathers who have not completed the age of 16 and daughters of indian fathers who have not completed the age of 13, while in all other cases it means unmarried children who have not completed the age of 18 years.2. as i have said, learned counsel for the opposite party invokes the exercise of my discretion. but the only discretion allowed under section 44 is in the matter of granting maintenance for minor children there is no discretion as regards maintenance for children who have ceased to be minor children under the definition contained in section 3(5) of the act. the english law cannot be invoked to widen the discretion of the courts in india. it was held in iswarayya v. iswarayya ('30) 17 a.i.r 1930 mad. 154, that there is no power under the act to make any provision for children who are no longer minor under the act; and if i may respectfully say so, this view is clearly right. if it were in my power to do so, i should willingly allow the respondent to receive maintenance upto the end of the year, but for.....