MohsIn Ali Vs. Masum Ali

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........before the date of the application then in question. those dates are set forth in the judgment itself, and the last date there given is the 10th of june, 1904, when a warrant for arrest of this judgment-debtor was applied for, and the finding is that the judgment-debtor was guilty of fraud in that he successfully evaded arrest. we are of opinion that upon a correct interpretation of clause 2 of section 48 of the code of civil procedure, the effect of the proviso embodied in that clause is that the bar to execution created by the first clause of the same section is removed for a period of twelve years from any date on which it is held that the judgment-debtor has by fraud prevented the execution of the decree. we have been referred to a ruling to the contrary in the case of sreenath gooho v. yusoof khan (1881) i.l.r. 7 calc 556. but it seems to us that the learned judge who decided that case has not given due effect to the words ' nothing in this section shall be deemed' at the beginning of clause 2, section 48 of the code of civil procedure. we are, accordingly of opinion that this appeal must prevail and that the orders of both the courts below must be set aside and the learned munsif directed to restore the application for execution to his file and endeavour to execute the warrant of arrest applied for by the decree-holder. if as the learned judge seems to think, there is reason to suspect that the decree-holder has applied for this warrant of arrest without serious intent of getting it executed, it should be easy enough for the court to deal with such tactics on his part. the application has been dismissed merely on the ground that it is barred under the provisions of section 48 of the code of civil procedure and in that opinion we are unable to concur. the appellant will get his costs of these proceedings.