Queen Vs. Naiada

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........for life or with imprisonment which may extend, &c.;' while the court has an option in determining the duration of the term of imprisonment, it has no option in determining the duration of the term of transportation. by section 302 an offender convicted of murder shall be punished with death or transportation for life. by section 307 an offender convicted of an attempt to murder shall, if hurt be caused, be liable to transportation for life, or to imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years. by section 389 an offender convicted of extortion under certain circumstances may be punished with transportation for life. by section 75, on a second conviction of certain offences, an offender 'shall be subject to transportation for life or to double the amount of punishment for which he would otherwise be liable.' in no section of the code which prescribes transportation as a punishment, with the exception of section 59, is the language used such as to leave the court any option regarding the duration of the term. it follows that a sentence of transportation for a period less than life can only be passed under the provisions of section 59, and consequently that when an offence is punishable, either with transportation for life or imprisonment which may extend to ten years, if a sentence of transportation for a term less than life is awarded, the term cannot exceed ten years.