Mrs. Hazel May Murphy Vs. L.E. Murphy

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........the question therefore arises whether the learned district judge of saharanpur had jurisdiction to hear this petition. the matter turns upon the proper interpretation of the words 'where the husband and wife reside or last resided together' in sub-section (1) (j)*of section 3, divorce act, and the question is whether the word 'together' governs the word 'reside' as well as the words 'last resided'. we are of opinion that the better construction is to restrict the operation of the word 'together' to the immediately preceding words 'last resided' for as was pointed out by marten j. in d. a. borgonha v. w. c. borgonha, 44 bom. 924 : (a. i. r. (7) 1920 bom. 245):' . . . one very cogent reason for not making the word 'together' govern the word 'reside' is that one can hardly imagine any case in which the husband and wife would be residing together at the date of the presentation of a divorce petition. for one thing to do so would almost inevitably raise the strongest suspicion of collusion or connivance, and lead to the petition being dismissed. for instance, a wife's petition must depend on adultery plus either desertion or cruelty. obviously in no petition founded on desertion could the parties be living together at the date of the petition. and it is difficult to imagine any ease in which a wife who is charging her husband with adultery and cruelty, would still be residing with him.' that case has become the leading authority on the subject and has been followed, so far as we are aware, by all the high courts in india which have had to consider this question. it was followed by a single judge of this court in the case of dora ina eates v. eric nevel eates : air1949 all421 in which most of the earlier authorities are cited. learned counsel has also drawn our attention to two other cases m. m. robey v. a. v. robey : air1931 cal121 and t. a. kershaw v. a. c. kershaw a. i. r. (17) 1930 lah. 916 : (12 lah. 214) in which the same view has been taken by the calcutta and.....